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  Conservation agencies worldwide are facing rapid, volatile social and ecological change, 
which is especially problematic for bureaucratic, hierarchical conservation organizations 
that are designed to be stable and resistant to change. The current science and management 
paradigm based on Progressive era ideology is proving to be inadequate to deal with this 
change, and the need for a new paradigm that embraces complexity and uncertainty in our 
social ecological systems is emerging.  
  The National Park Service (NPS) is one of these organizations that has acknowledged the 
need to better adapt to a changing environment. An external science committee 
recommends in Revisiting Leopold: Resource Stewardship in the National Parks 
(Revisiting Leopold) that the agency transform itself into one that recognizes relationships 
within social ecological systems at different scales, forms new partnerships, and accepts 
complexity, uncertainty, and dynamism as integral components of social ecological 
systems. However, organizational change is challenging due to structural and cultural 
factors and underlying assumptions that stymie organizational learning and adaptation.  
  The problem addressed in this thesis is that while Revisiting Leopold highlights the need 
for the organization to adopt a new ideology better suited to complex social ecological 
systems, the process of transforming this type of agency on an organizational level is 
difficult. To address this problem and better understand how managers perceive the ideas in 
Revisiting Leopold, twenty-three semi-structured interviews were conducted with managers 
across the NPS. In particular, this study evaluates the events, patterns, structures, cultures, 
and mental models at play within the organization. Several system archetypes and 
organizational learning disabilities emerged from the data that limit the ability of the 
organization to embrace a new management and scientific paradigm. This study also 
contributes to a greater understanding of the NPS as a system, which allows for the 
identification of leverage points that can be utilized if the NPS chooses to transform itself 
into this new paradigm.   
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Background 
Worldwide, conservation agencies and organizations are facing extraordinary 
complexity and rapid, turbulent change in social ecological systems (Walker, Carpenter, 
Anderies, Able, Cumming, Janssen, Norberg, Peterson, & Pritchard, 2002); in fact, in an 
age of ever increasing information and data, managers across numerous diverse fields and 
industries are experiencing unprecedented levels of complexity (Senge, 2006). 
Traditionally, protected areas have been viewed as “nature islands,” or a fortress model, in 
which biodiversity conservation can best be attained by delineating protected areas where 
ecosystems are permitted to operate untouched by people (Neumann, 2005). For many 
conservation agencies, the current science and management paradigm, based on this 
fortress model and generally characterized by a related reductionist, positivist philosophy 
and highly specialized science, is proving to be inadequate (Fairfax, 2005). New issues that 
managers face are much broader, often global, in scale with more lasting impacts. 
Scientists understand little about their effects and their complex causal relationships. 
However, managers still must make decisions with limited understanding (Funtowicz & 
Ravetz, 1993). As a result, the current worldview “is being replaced by a systemic, 
synthetic, and humanistic approach,” in which “natural systems are recognized as dynamic 
and complex…The science appropriate to this new condition will be based on the 
assumptions of unpredictability, incomplete control, and a plurality of legitimate 
perspectives” (Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1993, p. 739). 
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However, while there is some level of recognition that science and management 
paradigms must change in this current era of turbulence and uncertainty, some conservation 
agencies are having more difficulty adapting to a changing environment. This particularly 
occurs in mission-driven conservation agencies with strong cultures, in which the agency’s 
missions and goals are heavily based on values and an ethical drive. Organizations with 
strong cultures sometimes find it challenging to respond to changes in their environment 
(Nyambe, 2005; Sorensen, 2002).  Perhaps more problematic is the top-down, hierarchical 
nature of government bureaucracies that prevent them from being responsive and 
adaptable, because this type of structure is often inefficient and expensive (Osborne, 1993).  
Even in an attempt to be adaptive, large bureaucratic organizations tend towards 
stability, because organizations are inclined to institutionalize what has worked in the past 
and aim for predictability. Lack of stability, dependability, and meaning is difficult for 
most organizations and therefore creates trepidation of change, stemming from a fear of 
uncertainty (Schein, 1995). “But, if the economic, political, technological, and socio-
cultural global environment will itself become more turbulent and unpredictable, then new 
problems will constantly emerge and solutions [the organization has] developed will 
constantly become inadequate” (Schein, 1995, p. 4). In other words, even though they may 
recognize a need to be more flexible and adaptive, bureaucratic organizations tend to resist 
change.  
Many conservation agencies of this type exist, but the NPS presents an appropriate 
and timely case study. In 1963, a committee appointed by the then Secretary of the Interior 
Stewart Udall and chaired by Aldo Starker Leopold published Wildlife Management in the 
National Parks: The Leopold Report. The report has been highly influential upon the 
ideology of the National Park Service (NPS, 2012b) and maintains that “a national park 
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should present a vignette of primitive America” (NPS, 1963). However, in light of an 
emerging understanding of the complexity of social ecological systems, accelerating 
climactic and environmental change, scientific advances, and a more diverse population of 
Americans and park visitors, the National Park System Advisory Board Science Committee 
revisited the original report in 2012. The director of the NPS charged the committee, 
composed primarily of external scientists, with reexamining the goals and policies of 
resource management and actions required to implement these policies; the resulting 
product was a report entitled Revisiting Leopold: Resource Stewardship in the National 
Parks, hereafter referred to a Revisiting Leopold. The new report calls for recognizing that 
“parks exist as coupled natural-human systems,” are “embedded in larger regional and 
continental landscapes influenced by adjacent land and water uses and regional cultures” 
(NPS, 2012b, p. 9), and a need for increased collaboration, new partnerships, and expanded 
networks (NPS, 2012a). Revisiting Leopold notes that the new ideology of resource 
stewardship must focus on system resilience and processes as much as the visible iconic 
species. This means that “broad disciplinary and interdisciplinary scientific knowledge and 
scholarship are necessary to manage for change while confronting uncertainty” (NPS, 
2012b, p. 10). Revisiting Leopold explicitly recognizes the complexity, uncertainty and 
continual change that is inherent in ecosystems and the surrounding socio-political context 
and highlights the need for managers to increase resilience and think at broader 
geographical and political scales (NPS, 2012b).  
The difference in rhetoric between the original 1963 Leopold Report and more 
recent NPS documents, such as the 2012 Revisiting Leopold report, is evidence of an 
paradigm shift occurring among scientists and upper-level managers in the NPS from an 
era of positivism and short-term issue-driven management to a new era of learning, 
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recognizing relationships within social ecological systems at different scales, forming new 
partnerships, and accepting complexity, uncertainty, and change as integral components of 
social ecological systems.  
This new paradigm differs from the current status quo in the NPS because current 
science is highly specialized and “technically esoteric” (Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1993; Lewis, 
2007), and policies reflect a relatively static view of park resources. The current model is 
partially based on a system with one set of desired conditions that can and should be 
maintained over time in which human actions result in predictable effects. (NPS, 2006, 
section 2.2; NPS, 2006, section 4.11). Revisiting Leopold maintains that science continues 
to play a critical role in resource stewardship, but that resilience, landscape-scale 
stewardship, and interdisciplinary science must be emphasized now and into the future 
(NPS, 2012b). The recently published Call to Action report echoes the sentiments of 
Revisiting Leopold. In the Call to Action, the NPS outlines its vision for 2016 and its 
second century. It characterizes the first century of the agency as “focused on stewardship 
and enjoyment of special places,” but calls for a second century vision in which it will 
“extend benefits of conservation across physical, social, political, and international 
boundaries in partnership with others,” as well as “adapt to the changing needs of visitors, 
communities, and partners; encouraging organizational innovation; and give employees the 
chance to reach their full potential” (NPS, 2012a, p. 5).  Among many other goals, it directs 
parks to “increase resilience in the face of climate change,” “develop a multi-sector 
workforce that can adapt to continuous change, think systemically, evaluate risk, make 
decisions based on the best science and scholarship,” and “build a more flexible and 
adaptive organization” (NPS, 2012a, pp. 17–21). However, while parts of the organization 
may already do this to some extent, some elements of this vision have yet to be realized. 
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The specifics of what a resilient, more flexible, and adaptive agency would look like, as 
well as how the NPS would get there, remains to be seen. 
1.2 Problem Statement 
	  
While the Revisiting Leopold report recognizes the need to better adapt to a 
changing environment, the NPS is one of several large, bureaucratic, hierarchical 
organizations. While it is not an internal policy document, Revisiting Leopold recommends 
that the agency become more adaptable by transforming itself into an agency that 
recognizes relationships within social ecological systems at different scales, forms new 
partnerships, and accepts complexity, uncertainty, and dynamism as integral components of 
social ecological systems. However, organizational change within bureaucratic 
organizations can be challenging due to cultural and structural factors that reinforce 
stability and resistance to change, which simultaneously stymies organizational learning 
and adaptation (Osborne, 1993).  
Thus, the current problem is that an external science committee and some members 
of the NPS have recognized the need for the organization to adopt a new ideology better 
suited to a complex social ecological system, but structural and cultural barriers are 
preventing the agency from moving into a new paradigm.  
1.3 Guiding Questions 
	  
 The primary research question in this study is whether and how the NPS can 
transform as an organization in order to adapt to a complex, changing, and 
uncertain environment. Using systems thinking as a conceptual framework, this 
research explores (1) how mangers perceive and react to the ideas outlined in the 
Revisiting Leopold report, (2) the structural and cultural components of the NPS as 
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a system and underlying mental models that affect the ability of the NPS to 
implement the ideas in Revisiting Leopold and (3) processes, feedbacks, and 
“learning disabilities” that affect the ability of the NPS to become a learning 
organization.  
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Chapter 2: Concepts That Frame This Research  
 
 The conceptual frameworks for this study serve as the link between the research 
problem, literature, methodology, and analysis. In particular, they help frame and better 
understand the following questions:  
1. How do mangers perceive and understand the ideas outlined in the Revisiting 
Leopold report?  
2. What are the structural and cultural components of the NPS as a system and 
underlying mental models that affect the ability of the NPS to implement the ideas 
in Revisiting Leopold? And, 
3. What are the processes, feedbacks, and “learning disabilities” that affect the ability 
of the NPS to become a learning organization? 
The conceptual frameworks also guide decisions about who in the organization to talk to 
and the development of appropriate interview questions that help answer the guiding 
research questions.  
This thesis employs systems thinking as the primary conceptual framework, and 
relies most heavily on Peter Senge’s model (Figure 1). The context for this study is 
increasing complexity and change in social ecological systems, making systems thinking 
particularly applicable because of its ability to identify recurring patterns, processes, and 
relationships in the midst of dynamic complexity. The ideas presented in the Revisiting 
Leopold report, such as managing for change, embracing uncertainty, working across 
boundaries at landscape and seascape scales, and managing for resiliency, among others, 
align neatly with the components of systems thinking. 
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Figure	  1:	  Systems	  Thinking	  as	  a	  Primary	  Conceptual	  Framework 
 
 A number of other academic fields are also relevant to and contributed the research 
questions in this study (Table 1). Systems thinking was therefore an appropriate model 
because components of the concept emerge in literature across disciplines. The 
fundamental concepts of Senge’s framework also resonate through Schein’s work on 
organizational culture (Schein, 1995), Meadow’s work in the field of sustainability 
(Meadows, 1999), Fernandez and Rainey’s research in public administration (Fernandez & 
Rainey, 2006), Kotter’s research on leadership and organizational change (Kotter, 2007), 
and to an extent, Rogers’ diffusion of innovation theory (Rogers, 2003), among others. 
Thus, systems thinking served as a useful unifying thread.  
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Table	  1:	  Supporting	  Concepts	  and	  Their	  Application	  to	  this	  Study	  
Supporting Concepts Application 
Scientific Paradigms (Khun & Popper) How do scientific paradigms change? 
Postnormal Science (Funtowicz & Ravetz) Why is the current scientific paradigm inadequate? 
Diffusion of Innovations (Rogers) Who are the change agents (early adopters) in the NPS? 
Social Ecological Systems (Ostram, 
Walker & Salt, others) 
What does this new paradigm look like? Do 
managers understand it? Are NPS managers 
systems thinkers? 
 
While this study focuses more on systemic processes and barriers to organizational 
change than it does on how a scientific paradigm shift would occur in the NPS, questions 
about the nature of paradigm shifts remain relevant and provide useful background. In 
particular, Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn provide background and raise interesting 
questions about how scientific paradigms change, specifically with regard to whether new 
scientific approaches occur gradually and incrementally or whether there is a more abrupt 
paradigm shift in response to some crisis. 
In turn, the nature of scientific change leads to questions about the role of science in 
the NPS. The concept of postnormal science presents one way to think about a new type of 
science appropriate to the complex, value-laden environment in which conservation 
agencies often operate and helps formulate questions about the type of decisions that 
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managers make and the way that science, values, risk, and uncertainty factor into NPS 
decision-making.  
The properties of this new paradigm as described in Revisiting Leopold are 
consistent with the properties of systems thinking and resilience. These concepts help to 
define the “system” and unpack the new ideology that Revisiting Leopold is describing. In 
other words, these theoretical concepts help identify what this new ideology looks like. The 
concept of systems thinking (of which resilience is a component) leads to questions about 
how Revisiting Leopold is perceived by NPS managers, whether it is understood by 
managers, whether it is indeed a new way of thinking or something managers feel they are 
already doing, and whether managers think that adopting and implementing this new 
ideology is even possible.  
 Finally, literature on the nature and characteristics of organizational change inform 
the sampling frame and the formulation of questions about whether and how the 
organization can undergo this type of transformation and become a learning organization. 
Diffusion of innovation theory speaks to how new ideas diffuse through organizations and 
how different types of people play different roles in the spread of a new idea; therefore it 
informs who was interviewed for this study. Organizational culture literature informs 
questions and analysis about the process of culture change in an organization, incentive 
structures, success, and risk-taking. Senge’s framework for creating a learning organization 
through the use of systems thinking contributes to analysis by highlighting factors that 
facilitate and hinder learning and adaptation in an organization at a variety of system levels. 
Finally, this study relies on Senge’s concept of archetypes and learning to support data 
analysis by helping to isolate patterns, processes, and feedback loops that affect the ability 
of the organization to learn and adapt. Together, the literature on diffusion of innovation 
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theory, learning organizations, organizational culture, and systems thinking has informed 
questions about and analysis of whether and how the NPS can move into this new 
paradigm, the structural and cultural barriers that affect the ability to adopt the ideas in 
Revisiting Leopold and become more adaptive, and who in the organization to interview. 
2.1 How Do We Think About Paradigm Shifts and Scientific Approaches? 
 
Many of the ideas expressed in Revisiting Leopold, especially related to systems 
thinking and resilience, surfaced in academic literature the 1960’s and 1970’s respectively 
(Ackoff, 1962; Holling, 1973; Mingers & White, 2010), so why have they taken so long to 
emerge in NPS rhetoric? If the NPS is indeed moving towards a different scientific 
paradigm than the status quo, then it becomes important to understand how scientific 
paradigms change and the role of science in the NPS.  
2.1.1 How do Scientific Paradigms Change? 
	  
 Thomas Kuhn, in his seminal 1962 book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 
argues that change does not happen gradually. Rather, a new scientific regime replaces an 
existing scientific regime when it becomes evident that the existing approach is inadequate 
to address problems or explain anomalies posed by the environment. He terms these 
scientific revolutions “paradigm shifts” as a response to the view of “normal science,” that 
scientific knowledge accumulates and builds upon itself. The success of normal science, 
Kuhn writes, is attributable to “the ability of scientists regularly to select problems that can 
be solved with conceptual and instrumental techniques close to those already in existence” 
(Kuhn, 1998, p. 90).  Instead, according to Kuhn, paradigms change in response to some 
crisis that causes the abandonment of a previous paradigm or institutional framework 
(Kuhn, 1998).  
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 The alternative view and primary criticism of Kuhn’s assessment of scientific 
change is based on Karl Popper’s argument that change occurs incrementally and no 
paradigm is dominant. The objective of science is to find truth by the process of 
falsification and deduction; the elimination of what can be proved false will generate 
further scientific questions and in this way, new theories emerge. Thus Popper believes that 
knowledge evolves through “permanent scientific revolutions,” that each rejection of false 
scientific claims represents a revolution (Shareef, 1997). 
 This debate raises key questions for the shift in the scientific and managerial 
approach of the NPS. If the current science and management paradigm, generally 
characterized by a related reductionist, positivist philosophy and highly specialized science, 
is inadequate (Fairfax, 2005), then will the NPS be forced to change in response to a crisis? 
Will change happen incrementally, as Popper suggests? The question of whether a 
paradigm shift in the NPS will occur according to Khunian or Popper philosophies is 
beyond the scope of this research, but the literature on how scientific paradigms change 
provides important context for understanding the unique position in which the NPS finds 
itself.  
2.1.2 What is the Role of Science in an Era of Complexity and Change? 
	  
These questions translate into related queries about what the old and potentially 
new scientific paradigms look like. For example, the question above inspired by Kuhn’s 
work concerning the limitations and anomalies in both the old and new paradigms lead to 
questions about the current and future role of science in the NPS. Whatever the nature of 
scientific change, why is the old scientific paradigm inadequate, and what will be the new 
approach to science? The concept of postnormal science presents one way to think about a 
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new type of science appropriate to the complex, value-laden environment in which 
conservation agencies often operate, and informs questions about the type of decisions that 
managers make and the way science is used in NPS decision-making.  
 Many of the important decisions made by NPS mangers involve high profile, 
complicated situations in which stakeholders have polarized values (Lewis, 2007). 
Funtowicz and Ravetz discuss the inadequacies of traditional scientific methodologies in 
these instances and the emergence of a new scientific regime that is much better suited to 
situations involving high stakes, high levels of complexity, contested values, and urgent 
decisions (Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1993).  
Before proceeding, it is important to define what is meant by complexity in this 
context. Emergent complexity within a system differs from ordinary complexity in its 
characteristics of stability and change. A system of emergent complexity is more unstable 
and experiences constant novelty. The behavior of ordinary complexity can be explained by 
processes with basic purposeful goals such as growth and survival. Emergent complex 
systems, however, do not operate “mechanistically and functionally; in them, at least some 
of the elements of the system possess individuality, along with some degree of 
intentionality, consciousness, foresight, purpose, symbolic representations and morality” 
(Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1994, p. 570). The difference between these two types of systems is 
the difference between a closed, predictable system and the more value-laden, volatile 
social ecological systems in which parks are operating today. Therefore, references to 
increasingly complex systems throughout this paper refer to systems characterized by 
emergent complexity.  
 Given the emergently complex systems in which the NPS functions, Funtowicz and 
Ravetz contend that traditional, positivist science is inadequate.  
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“The reductionist, analytical worldview which divides systems into ever smaller 
elements, studied by ever more esoteric specialism, is being replaced by a systemic, 
synthetic, and humanistic approach. The old dichotomies of facts and values, and of 
knowledge and ignorance, are being transcended. Natural systems are recognized as 
dynamic and complex; those involving interactions with humanity are ‘emergent,’ 
including properties of reflection and contradiction. The science appropriate to this 
new condition will be based on the assumptions of unpredictability, incomplete 
control, and a plurality of legitimate perspectives.” (Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1993, p. 
739) 
The supremacy of the scientific method and the “technically esoteric” expertise of its 
scientists have subjugated all other forms of knowledge. Local knowledge of the 
environment, experience, and skills have been diminished and replaced by a form of 
science that in reality only legitimizes the knowledge of those with the ability to dedicate 
many years to higher education. Additionally, as mentioned above, this existing scientific 
paradigm is inadequate to address complexities and values associated current management 
issues (Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1993). Alvin Weinberg makes a similar argument in his 
differentiation between research and trans-science, in which he argues that some scientific 
questions contain so many variables and complex relationships that they cannot be 
answered by science. In short, research science, premised on unanimity and the absence of 
ambiguity, is insufficient for policy-making (Weinberg, 1972). For the purpose of this 
study, these insights prompt more specific research questions, such as, what types of 
decisions are managers faced with, and how do they make these decisions? What is the role 
of science, politics, and stakeholder values in decision-making? How are decision-makers 
dealing with complexity and change that is not fully understood? 
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Funtowicz and Ravetz present postnormal science as a response to postmodern 
science, in which postnormal methodology accepts and addresses uncertainty, and values 
are dealt with overtly, rather than presumed. Geographic, temporal, and historical context is 
critical, and interactive communication is the basis for making scientific cases rather than 
the process of deduction (Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1993). Since “the policy issues of risk and 
the environment present the most urgent problems for science, uncertainty and quality are 
moving in from the periphery…of scientific methodology to become the central, 
integrating concepts”(Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1993, p. 792). This is not to suggest, however, 
that traditional positivist or applied science is not valuable or applicable, but that it is most 
useful when uncertainty and decision stakes are low. When uncertainty and decision stakes 
are high, they suggest professional consultancy (Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1993).  
However, Carolan (2006) provides a critique of the democratization of science when 
complexity and risk are high, particularly as it relates to resource management and 
environmental decision-making. The inclusion of non-scientists in risky, complex, value-
laden situations condones the exclusion of non-scientists when addressing more 
straightforward scientific questions; in other words, distinguishing between postmodern or 
research science and a different type of science that addresses uncertainty, such as 
postnormal science, implies that uncertainty is not inherent in science itself. As an 
alternative, the author proposes viewing problem-solving and decision making through the 
lens of various types of expertise. Particularly relevant to resource management issues is 
that of “public expertise,” referring to the integration of public values, which is especially 
vital when addressing environmental risks and hazards, as well as issues based on value 
judgments. If traditional equilibrium models are being replaced by acceptance of dynamic 
non-equilibrium models, then opinions about what states of an ecosystem are acceptable, or 
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the “right” ones present a new avenue for value judgments, in which case multiple types of 
expertise and the recognition of multiple legitimate perspectives is necessary (Carolan, 
2006). While improving the adequacy of scientific methodology to deal with emergently 
complex systems is essential, Turnpenny et al. (2010) note that improved evidence does not 
automatically cause improved or even different decision-making. Existing organizational 
structures, laws, and policies may limit the scope of possible options and solutions, which 
hampers the open dialogue that postnormal science espouses (Turnpenny, Jones, & 
Lorenzoni, 2010).  
The points and critiques that Carolan raises inform this research by raising the 
questions about the role of uncertainty and risk in all scientific decisions. For example, to 
understand the role of science in NPS decision-making, questions about how managers deal 
with uncertainty and risk as well as how acceptable it is to express uncertainty or take risks 
when making decisions become relevant. Because NPS managers often have to make 
value-judgments about what constitutes “ecosystem health,” or what states of an ecosystem 
are deemed the “right” ones, managers were also asked about public expertise in making 
value-laden decisions. In the final portion of this chapter, organizational behavior literature 
helps address Turnpenny et al.’s points about institutional structures that limit the 
implementation of postnormal science.  
This concept of postnormal science (or trans-science) and its critiques will help 
distinguish between characteristics of the old and new paradigm, as well as bring to bear 
the limitations of different scientific approaches in solving complex resource management 
problems. The literature highlights the emergent complexity of the socio-ecological 
systems in which the NPS operates and helps characterize shifting scientific ideologies and 
approaches in the NPS as well as the type of information that is informing manager’s 
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decisions. Finally, the concepts of emergent complexity and the nature of the urgent, high 
stakes, value-laden decisions that managers are faced with helps narrow the sample to 
managers at high-profile parks where management decisions are often publicly contested. 
2.2 What are the Properties of This “New” Paradigm? 
	  
The properties of this new paradigm as described in Revisiting Leopold are 
consistent with the properties of systems thinking and resilience. Systems thinking and 
resilience literature serve both to help define the “system” and better understand the new 
ideology that Revisiting Leopold is describing. The concept of systems thinking (of which 
resilience is a component), informs questions about how Revisiting Leopold is perceived by 
NPS managers, whether it is understood by managers, whether it is indeed a new way of 
thinking or something managers feel they are already doing, and whether managers think 
that adopting and implementing this new ideology is even possible.  
2.2.1 What is the “System?” 
	  
The literature and rhetoric surrounding SES research and resilience thinking often 
employ the term “system,” and Elinor Ostrom helps readers understand and define a 
system. She warns against oversimplification, yet offers a conceptual model in which a 
system is comprised of interacting attributes of a resource structure (e.g. a forest, lake, or 
grazing area), the resource units produced (e.g. timber, fish, cattle), the users of the system, 
and the governance of the system, and each of these four components have multiple 
variables (Anderies, Janssen, & Ostrom, 2004; Ostrom, 2007). Applied to the NPS, the 
system at a broad organizational level consists of (1) all of the National Park System units, 
including their biophysical resources,  (2) the resource units they produce, including but not 
limited to visitor experiences, ecosystem services, and cultural meanings, (3) the users of 
Organizational Adaptation in an Era of Complexity, Uncertainty, and Change 
	  
	   18	  
the system, or employees, visitors, interest groups, local people, and those interested in or 
affected by park management, and (4) the governance, or laws, policies, and management 
decisions that affect the parks. However, a system exists within a nested hierarchy of 
systems, meaning there are multiple complex systems at various scales that influence each 
other (Walker & Salt, 2006, p.89). In other words, the NPS system exists within a larger 
system of the federal government, while simultaneously encompassing many smaller 
systems at the regional and park unit levels and smaller. Revisiting Leopold asks managers 
to think about the hierarchy of larger systems in which they operate; therefore, interview 
questions were partly designed to gauge the scales at which managers think and operate.  
2.2.2 What is Systems Thinking and Why is it Useful? 
	  
Systems thinking began by examining concepts such as how segments of systems 
contribute to the whole, environmental and system boundaries, system structure, processes, 
hierarchies, feedback loops, and the role of knowledge of and control over systems 
(Mingers & White, 2010). Ackoff, an early founder of the field, raised the point that 
management problems are often misdiagnosed and improper methodologies are applied. 
While traditional science is highly useful for identifying whether a specific phenomenon 
causes another, it has no way to discover what other phenomena, events, or objects may 
have also caused the problem or situation. This shortcoming indicates the need to better 
understand organizational structure, communication, and decision-making processes 
(Ackoff, 1962).  
As the applicability of the systems thinking concepts to a variety of fields became 
evident, these concepts coalesced into what is now largely referred to as the systems 
approach. The systems approach generally refers to four primary components: (1) 
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understanding a circumstance holistically rather than from a reductionist mindset and the 
varied interacting variables within a social ecological environment; (2) acknowledging that 
relationships between variables are more significant than the variables themselves in 
affecting system behavior; (3) understanding a hierarchy of nested systems, each with their 
own properties, that also mutually influence each other; and (4) acknowledging that people 
behave in different ways due to differing goals, agendas, and rationalities (Mingers & 
White, 2010). 
	   Systems thinking addresses many of the issues facing the NPS today. In light of the 
increasing complexity and scale involved in today’s resource stewardship problems, as well 
as the volatility and unpredictability of rapid social and environmental change, Revisiting 
Leopold calls for a recognition of “coupled human-natural systems,” a focus on system 
resilience and processes, and a new science and stewardship ideology based on new 
partnerships, thinking at broader scales, and interdisciplinary scholarship” (NPS, 2012b). 
Peter Senge notes the importance of systems thinking for all institutions and organizations.  
“Today, systems thinking is needed more than ever because we are becoming 
overwhelmed by complexity. Perhaps for the first time in history, human kind 
has the capacity to create far more information than anyone can absorb, to 
foster far greater interdependency than anyone can manage, and to accelerate 
change far faster than anyone’s ability to keep pace.” (Senge, 2006, p. 69)  
Senge goes on to explain how organizations can use systems thinking to become more 
productive and successful learning organizations, or how they can adapt to change and 
unpredictability in their complex environment. “Adaptability captures the capacity of a 
social ecological system to learn, combine experience and knowledge, adjust its responses 
to changing external drivers and internal processes, and continue developing within the 
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current stability domain” (Folke, Carpenter, Walker, Scheffer, & Chapin, 2010, p. 2). Thus, 
a learning organization is one that is highly adaptable, and the field of systems thinking 
encompasses tools and concepts of organizational learning and adaptability that can be 
mutually informative.  
 Incorporating systems thinking in order to become more adaptable is largely what 
Revisiting Leopold is asking the NPS to do. The literature on systems thinking helps 
formulate questions about whether NPS managers understand the properties of this new 
ideology. For example, in order gauge managers’ understanding of these concepts, they 
were asked how they envision the agency dealing with complexity and change. As 
Revisiting Leopold talks about “coupled human-natural systems,” managers were also 
asked how they distinguish between and deal with natural and anthropogenic components 
of the social ecological system. 
2.2.3 How is Resilience a Form of Systems Thinking? 
	  
 Resilience first emerged approximately forty years ago in C.S. Holling’s 1973 
article, Resilience and Stability of Ecological Systems (Holling, 1973). Resilience is a 
fundamental concept of systems thinking that addresses the dynamics and processes of 
social ecological systems (Folke et al., 2010). It incorporates contemporary concepts of 
nonequilibrium models of systems, promotes redundancy over efficiency (if more actors 
fill the same function, a system is more resilient), and encourages managers to identify 
thresholds (or points at which a system’s processes and properties reorganize and tend 
towards an alternative equilibrium or stable state), and collaborate with stakeholders 
(Walker & Salt, 2006; Brunson, 2012). Rather than assuming that systems reach a stable, 
static, climax state, a nonequilibrium model and resilience thinking in general recognizes 
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that systems are subject to disturbance, or shocks to the system (Brunson, 2012, p. 633) and 
have multiple stable states. Multiple stable states means that although a system may tend 
towards an equilibrium, there may be several possible and desirable equilibriums, and these 
equilibriums will change over time (Cote & Nightingale, 2011, p. 476). The term resilience 
specifically refers to how well a system can undergo shocks and disturbances and still 
retain the ability to function in a similar way such that its social and ecological processes 
and feedbacks are still intact (Holling, 1973, p. 14). 
A similar and related concept to resilience is that of robustness. Robustness refers to 
“the maintenance of system performance either when subjected to external, unpredictable 
perturbations, or when there is uncertainty about the value of internal design parameters” 
(Anderies et al., 2004, p. 1). A social ecological system is robust if it keeps the ecological 
component of the system from transferring into a new domain of attraction (stable state) 
that will not sustain people or will cause the social component of the system to suffer. 
While resilience is very similar and still quite useful in a conceptual sense, robustness is 
helpful when the system has an element of design, as opposed to being completely self-
organizing. In other words, in a system that is completely self-organized, it is difficult to 
create adaptive capacity (Anderies et al., 2004). In the NPS, robustness may help apply and 
design for resilience in a deliberate sense. 
For the purpose of this study, the concepts of systems thinking, resilience, and 
robustness inspire questions about how Revisiting Leopold is perceived and understood by 
NPS managers. Specifically, these concepts help assess whether managers understand the 
ideas in Revisiting Leopold, whether they believe it is indeed a new way of thinking, or 
whether it’s something they believe they are already doing.  Managers were asked to 
describe their reactions to and understanding of the report, whether they believe this 
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represents a shift in ideology or a new paradigm for the NPS, as well as what they believe a 
resilient National Park System would look like.  
2.3 What Do We Know About Organizational Change? 
	  
If managers understand this new ideology based on systems thinking, and believe 
that it’s both valuable and possible to attain, then questions about how a mission-driven 
organization transforms itself become particularly salient. This study drew upon literature 
from the disciplines of organizational change, business, organizational behavior, public 
administration, and others in order to formulate questions about whether and how the 
agency can transform itself and to decide whom to interview. This section discusses 
diffusion of innovation theory and the role of people in spreading a new idea through a 
social system, Peter Senge’s concept of the learning organization and structural 
impediments to learning and adaptation, and finally, ways in which organizational culture 
may present barriers to organizational change.  
2.3.1 How do New Ideas Diffuse Through Organizations? 
	  
Rogers (2003) defines an organization as “a stable system of individuals who work 
together to achieve common goals through a hierarchy of ranks and a division of labor. 
Organizations are created to handle large-scale routine tasks through a pattern of 
regularized human relationships” (Rogers, 2003, p.404). Their ability to coordinate 
individual efforts is partially a result of their stability and “high degree of structure that is 
imposed on communication patterns” (Rogers, 2003, p.404). Bureaucratic organizations are 
characterized by authoritarian control, in which policies and directions are given by those 
in authority and executed by the individuals who accept the structure of authority (Rogers, 
2003).   
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 Diffusion, as referred to in innovation research, “is the process in which an 
innovation is communicated through certain channels over time among the members of a 
social system” (Rogers, 2003, p. 5). Rogers also notes that “diffusion is a kind of social 
change, defined as the process by which alteration occurs in the structure and function of a 
social system” (Rogers, 2003, p.6). In this case, the new idea, or innovation, is the 
scientific and management ideology described in Revisiting Leopold. The social system is 
the NPS (although adoption of this new ideology would result in the understanding that the 
NPS is part of and connected to a larger socio-political system), and this research explores 
the change in structure and function of the NPS as a social system.   
 Diffusion of innovations theory suggests that the transmission of ideas happens 
most often between people who are alike, or homophilous, which can be problematic in 
organizations in which members are heterophilous, or come from different backgrounds, 
disciplines, and academic specialties. Organizations and people can also be more or less 
innovative, meaning the degree to which an idea is adopted earlier relative to other 
members of the system. Rogers defines five adopter categories of innovativeness, including 
the (1) innovators themselves, (2) early adopters, (3) early majority, (4) late majority, and 
(5) laggards. Time is also a factor in the rate of adoption, or “the relative speed with which 
an innovation is adopted by members of a social system” (Rogers, 2004, p.23). 
Thus, based on diffusion theory, this study focuses on early adopters, or the opinion 
leaders in the organization that serve as a role model for other individuals. Early adopters 
are respected and in a central position in the communication network of a system (Rogers, 
2003). This group has the most influence on how this new paradigm described in Revisiting 
Leopold is perceived, understood, and adopted. The pool of superintendents and resource 
managers at high profile parks likely fit this description: they are usually opinion leaders 
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and well respected within their parks. They are in a central position in the communication 
network because they are highly aware of and in-touch with policy from higher echelons of 
the NPS, but are also working on-the-ground in parks, and are attune to local issues. 
Additionally, several innovators were interviewed, or those who contributed to Revisiting 
Leopold, in order to provide additional insight into the thinking behind the report and how 
they envision the agency adopting this new ideology.  
While degree of innovativeness is an important component in the spread of a new 
idea, the social structure of an organization plays a key role as well. The social structure, or 
the “patterned social relationships among the members of a system” (Rogers, 2003, p. 24), 
lends predictability and regularity to the way humans behave and determines the how 
information is communicated through people in an organization. In addition to 
organizational structure, organizational culture can affect the diffusion and adoption of new 
ideas. Organizations have norms, or “established behavior patterns for members of a social 
system… [that] tell individuals what behavior they are expected to perform” (Rogers, 2003, 
p.26). In some cases, an organization’s norms can be impediments to innovation or change 
(Rogers, 2003). This concept, that social structure and culture of an organization play a role 
in the diffusion of a new idea in an organization, supports the use of organizational 
behavior literature to further investigate the adoption of this new ideology in the NPS.   
The concept of diffusion theory lends insight into how the social, structural, and 
cultural elements of the agency contribute to or inhibit the adoption of a new idea and 
supports a sampling frame composed primarily of superintendents and division chiefs, 
along with other early adopters at the regional and national level.  
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2.3.2 The NPS as a Learning Organization: What Facilitates and Hinders the NPS from 
Learning and Adaptation? 
	  
Government organizations of all kinds are encountering difficulties when it comes 
to adaptation, largely because of the systems in which they operate. Budget and hiring 
systems can be burdensome and inefficient, yet many of these systems worked well when 
they were created. Top-down, hierarchical agencies with many rules and regulations were 
originally designed to deliver a “standardized service,” or solve a problem, and bureaucrats 
were in control (Osborne, 1993). Now however, “in this environment of rapid change, the 
old top-down bureaucratic monopolies delivering standardized services are not effective. 
To be effective today, a government organization must be lean, fast on its feet, 
responsive…capable of adjusting to constant change, able to improve productivity” 
(Osborne, 1993, p. 351).  
Peter Senge’s model of the learning organization is particularly applicable to 
understanding the structure of the NPS and the processes and feedbacks operating within it. 
Senge describes five disciplines, or qualities of learning organizations, necessary to 
maximize their success. Additionally, he identifies several “learning disabilities” that limit 
learning and success within individuals and organizations, as well as ten “archetypes,” or 
structural reinforcing patterns common in organizations that prevent the attainment of 
common goals (Senge, 2006).  Systems thinking served as the primary conceptual basis for 
data analysis and was used as a tool to discern relationships, patterns, and structures 
occurring within the organization. In particular, Senge’s concepts of mental models, 
archetypes, and learning disabilities were used to identify feedbacks and processes that 
affect the ability of the organization to adapt and learn.  
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Systems thinking is the first yet most fundamental of the five disciplines. Senge’s 
description of systems thinking is based on paying attention to the whole system in which 
an organization operates and its interrelationships, as opposed to relying on the natural 
tendency to focus on individual components, or “snapshots.” This includes the 
understanding of how actions and decisions play out over time. Systems thinking in this 
context is a collection of knowledge and set of tools developed to help individuals and 
organizations discern relationships across broader scales (Senge, 2006). Another of the five 
disciplines concerns mental models, which “are deeply ingrained assumptions, 
generalizations, or even pictures or images that influence how we understand the world and 
how we take action” (Senge, 2006, p.8). Quite often, people are not explicitly aware of 
their mental models or how they influence their decisions and actions. Productive learning 
involves introspectively examining internal assumptions and perceptions, as well as sharing 
them and allowing mental models to be influenced by others (Senge, 2006). 
For example, Senge, Smith, Kruschwitz, Laur, and Schley present an “iceberg 
model” as a metaphor to illustrate how to examine complex situations at multiple levels. 
When organizations or people face difficult problems, it is easy to attribute it to a prior 
event. But, like an iceberg, much of the dynamics are occurring below the surface and 
aren’t immediately visible. Thus, to change an organization or solve a problem, it is 
important to look at patterns and trends, institutional structures, and mental models to 
understand the system (Figure 1). The further “down” on the iceberg, the more leverage 
one has to change the situation or influence the system (Senge et al., 2008). 
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Figure	  2:	  The	  Iceberg	  Model	  (Senge	  et	  al.,	  2008,	  p.	  174)	  
	  
Together, implementing Senge’s disciplines contributes to the development of a 
learning organization, or an organization that maximizes its success, adaptability, and 
sustainability. However, even the most successful organizations often do not maximize 
their potential due to common learning disabilities. “The way they are designed and 
managed, the way people’s jobs are defined, and, most importantly, the way we have all 
been taught to think and interact (not only in organizations but more broadly) create 
fundamental learning disabilities” (Senge, 2006, p.18). Senge defines seven learning 
disabilities that describe ways in which organizations hamper their own ability to learn and 
adapt. For example, organizations may fixate on events, in which a single, recent event 
becomes the explanation for a problem rather than “seeing the longer-term patterns of 
change that lie behind the events and from understanding the causes of those patterns” 
(Senge, 2006, p.21). Often, organizations and people fail to learn from their actions 
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because the consequences of those actions may not appear immediately, and teams of 
people are unable to learn because they are focused on protecting their immediate, personal 
interests and reducing the appearance of conflict or ignorance (Senge, 2006). 
Senge’s framework of systems thinking, including the concept of the iceberg model, 
serves as a useful tool with which to better understand how characteristics of the NPS exist 
at multiple “levels” of the iceberg and how these characteristics may be barriers to adopting 
the ideas in Revisiting Leopold. The concepts of learning disabilities and mental models 
frame the analysis of interview data in terms of fundamental barriers and underlying 
assumptions that hamper the ability of the NPS to becoming a learning organization 
capable of adapting to its changing environment.  Based on this concept of a learning 
organization, managers were asked about structural and cultural characteristics of the 
organization, including incentives for working towards longer-term goals rather than 
attaining short-term achievements and working with others at broader scales.   
2.3.3 What Are the Potential Structural Barriers to Adaptation and Why Do They Exist? 
	  
Like Senge’s learning disabilities, systems archetypes provided another useful 
framework to identify and describe organizational structure impediments in the NPS to 
becoming more adaptive and successful. However, where learning disabilities can operate 
at the level of a single person, a team, a park, or the whole organization, archetypes operate 
at the level of the system itself. “The purpose of the systems archetypes is to recondition 
our perceptions, so as to be more able to see structures at play, and to see the leverage in 
those structures” (Senge, 2006, p.94). The systems archetypes stem from a premise of 
systems thinking, that patterns and relationships of which an organization is unaware often 
are detrimental to the organization itself. Even among complex management problems, 
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predictable patterns emerge. Once they are identified, it becomes easier to identify leverage 
points, or places where a small change can result in a great improvement in the situation. 
Senge identifies ten systems archetypes, each of which has a unique structure of reinforcing 
processes (sometimes called positive feedback loops), balancing processes (or negative 
feedback loops), and delays or time lags (Senge, 2006).  
Identifying system archetypes from the interview data helps detect the larger 
feedbacks and processes at play in the NPS. This concept informed questions about 
organizational structure, challenges to implementing Revisiting Leopold, and whether 
respondents believe a mission-driven organization is structured to facilitate this kind of 
change. However, during the process of data analysis, system archetypes emerged 
throughout the data from a variety of interview questions.   
2.3.4. What Are the Potential Cultural Barriers to Adaptation and Why Do They Exist? 
	  
	   The NPS emerged from the Progressive era, a culture that became deeply ingrained 
in the agency (Fairfax, 2005). Fairfax characterizes the land management doctrine of this 
era as one in which “centralized science and priorities replaces local experience and goals” 
(Fairfax, 2005, p. 264). However, the current global trend towards cooperation and the 
incorporation of local input, experiences, and knowledge, is at odds with the agency’s 
traditional political forests culture. “Therefore, we have a tentative conclusion that 
Progressive Era agencies are culturally inappropriate to the present era… and paramilitary 
uniformed, government agencies like the NPS and USFS are not optimal, perhaps not 
viable, or even relevant, to the 21st century” (Fairfax, 2005, pp. 265–266). Thus, a further 
examination NPS culture as it relates to the agency’s ability to adapt to a rapidly changing 
environment is warranted.  
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Even in an attempt to be adaptive, organizations like the NPS tend towards stability, 
because organizations are inclined to institutionalize what has worked in the past and aim 
for predictability. Lack of stability, dependability, and meaning is difficult for most 
organizations and therefore creates trepidation of change, stemming from a fear of 
uncertainty. But, if an organization is unable to adapt, or “learn how to learn” (Schein, 
1995, p. 5), then the organization will fail, and likely won’t succeed unless it is able to 
reduce the anxiety associated with learning (Schein, 1995). More specifically, it is 
important to consider what kind of organizational culture would foster continual learning at 
the agency scale. Schein defines culture as “shared mental models – shared ways of how 
we perceive the world, what mental categories we use for sorting it out, how we 
emotionally react to what we perceive, and how we put value on things. Culture is about 
tacit ways of being; it reflects the deeper and more pervasive elements of our group life” 
(Schein, 1995, p. 11). 
Broadly speaking, U.S. culture as a whole often influences the culture of its 
organizations. Many organizations are based on a hierarchical model in which managers 
are expected to maintain total control and be dominant and confident in their decisions. 
Because this is not always consistent with reality, managers must themselves be able to 
learn and accept and admit their own susceptibility and uncertainty. Another hindrance to 
learning is that job duties are often very compartmentalized, or segregated from personal 
issues, such that job or task related problems are given priority over intrapersonal issues. 
The result of this compartmentalization is that the primary role of the managers is seen as 
quantitative, usually at the expensive of fostering more qualitative attributes such as 
communication and workplace dynamics. Additionally, organizational culture often has a 
bias towards the short-term rather than the long term. Reports and evaluations are often 
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based on short-term numbers rather than long-term morale or employee development. In 
reality, building an adaptable organization is a long-term effort (Schein, 1995). Schein’s 
work in the organizational culture literature helps identify cultural aspects of the NPS that 
affect its ability to learn and adapt. Managers were asked to describe how success is 
evaluated and rewarded and about incentives for working towards long-term goals rather 
than short-term goals. 
Organizational culture can be especially difficult to change when it is deeply 
ingrained (Levin & Sanger, 1994 in Sanger, 2008). While some theorists believe that the 
external environment drives organizational change, many leaders still attempt to change 
their organization from within (Sanger, 2008). Sanger’s study on creating a more flexible, 
adaptable, performance-based culture in government found that successful cultural 
transformation required “bold and sustained leadership” (Sanger, 2008, p. 641) in which 
leaders both model the cultural transformation themselves and communicate the goals to all 
employees, specifically by “pushing decision making down and empowering employees to 
act with accountability” (p. 641). Effective leaders encourage risk-taking by having a high 
tolerance for well-intentioned errors while creating a feedback system to see what works. 
Sanger found that successful cultural change involves “managing up as well as down” (p. 
641). Managers must redistribute power to encourage greater participation of all agency 
employees and create more flexible budget and spending rules; the capability to change 
plans along the way necessitates the backing of external stakeholders (Sanger, 2008). For 
the purpose of this thesis, Sanger’s work supported questions about risk-taking and the 
extent to which failure is tolerated in the work place; it also informed analysis around the 
level of flexibility managers feel they possess and recommendations for agency 
transformation.  
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In addition to leadership and incentive systems within an organization, the mission 
also has a strong influence on agency culture. The mission of a government agency can be 
empowering for employees, and a mission-driven agency can be quite effective when 
managers are able to “determine the best way to accomplish their agency’s mission” 
(Osborne, 1993, p. 353). Creating a vision and a sense of purpose is perhaps one of the 
most fundamental components of a successful organization, because goals, values, and 
behaviors all stem from the organization’s mission. A mission is most powerful if 
employees throughout all levels of the organization buy into it, rather than if it is merely 
pushed from the top-down. In fact, there are often “meaning-makers” within various levels 
of an organization that articulate and manifest what the group of employees as a whole 
truly stands for and works towards (Raelin, 2006).   
The mission of the NPS is to “preserve unimpaired the natural and cultural 
resources and values of the national park system for the enjoyment, education, and 
inspiration of this and future generations” (NPS, 2014). Preserving resources “unimpaired” 
appears to imply a contradiction to some of the ideas in Revisiting Leopold such as 
managing for change and uncertainty. Because of the importance of the mission within a 
mission-driven agency, and the importance of “meaning-makers” throughout an 
organization, respondents were asked questions about the mission as it relates to Revisiting 
Leopold in order to understand the degree of buy-in amongst these early adopters and the 
meaning they ascribe to the mission. 
Measurement of organizational culture in the literature most often uses values as a 
representation of culture (Jones, Jimmieson, & Griffiths, 2005). A common framework 
used to assess organizational culture is the Competing Values Framework (CVF), which 
examines the competing demands of organizations. Two axes create four quadrants. On the 
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horizontal axis, an organization either focuses on their internal or their external 
environment; on the vertical axis, an organization values either flexibility or control (Jones 
et al., 2005; Parker & Bradley, 2000). Government conservation agencies in the U.S., such 
as the NPS, typically fall within the control/internal focus quadrant, or the “internal process 
model,” which displays a “hierarchical culture…involving the enforcement of rules, 
conformity, and attention to technical matters” (Parker & Bradley, 2000). Parker and 
Bradley suggest that this hierarchical culture may inhibit public sector organizations from 
transforming, regardless of policies that may be in place to encourage change (Parker & 
Bradley, 2000). How then, can cultural change in the NPS occur? Parker and Bradley’s 
work suggests that even if the NPS changes its policies to reflect current ecological 
knowledge, cultural change will not necessarily follow. 
One way to assess whether NPS culture can change is by examining readiness for 
change.  Jones, Jimmieson, and Griffiths (2005) examined how organizational culture 
influences readiness for change and change implementation success. The authors define 
readiness for change as “the extent to which employees hold positive views about the need 
for organizational change (i.e. change acceptance), as well as the extent to which 
employees believe that such changes are likely to have positive implications for themselves 
and the wider organization” (Jones et al., 2005, p. 362). Employees who believe their 
organization has flexible polices and procedures are more likely to perceive their agency 
and coworkers as being more responsive to change, and opposition to change is typically 
minimal in a supportive and inclusive culture (Jones et al., 2005). Unfortunately, as the 
NPS falls within the control/internal focus quadrant, or the “internal process model,” 
readiness for change is likely to be quite low. However, if an organization wants to increase 
its readiness for change to facilitate a more fundamental cultural change, it should work to 
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enhance open communication, participatory decision-making, and the perception that its 
policies and procedures can be flexible. 
There are a variety of theoretical perspectives on how organizational change occurs 
within the public sector, specifically regarding whether cultural change is catalyzed by 
internal or external drivers. Despite disparities in the literature, there seems to be some 
agreement on components of successful organizational change in practice. Fernandez and 
Rainey (2006) present eight determinants of successful implementation of organizational 
change in the public sector, which share commonalities with Lovegrove, Ulosevich, and 
Warner’s (2010) five frames of transformation in government. Both strategies focus on 
ways that managers can lead and foster effective change.  
Fernandez and Rainey’s eight determinants are distilled from common themes 
prevalent in the organizational change literature. The authors note that the process is not 
necessarily linear and all steps may not be necessary, but each contributes positively to 
successful change initiatives. The eight determinants are: (1) effectively communicate the 
need for change; (2) provide a plan with a clear, specific strategy based on causal theory; 
(3) build internal support and participation; (4) ensure top management support and have 
someone champion the cause; (5) build external support from stakeholders; (6) provide 
resources (financial, human, and technological); (7) institutionalize change by monitoring 
and sustaining implementation over time; and (8) pursue comprehensive change by 
understanding the subsystems of the organization and ensuring that the change is consistent 
throughout (Fernandez & Rainey, 2006). These eight determinants are also remarkably 
similar to Kotter’s (2005) eight steps for organizational transformation (Kotter, 2007). 
 Based upon Fairfax’s view that the current NPS mission is no longer culturally 
relevant, Schein’s view that large organizations are hesitant to change their fundamental 
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meanings, and Jones et al.’s concept of readiness for change, managers were asked about 
whether they believe a mission-driven organization such as the NPS can undergo this type 
of change, and whether the NPS mission facilitates this type of paradigm shift. 
Organizational culture literature suggests that organizations may not be able to adapt if 
risk-taking is discouraged, and if employees believe agency policies to be inflexible, 
particularly with regard to budget and spending rules. In order to understand cultural 
barriers to change, this literature informed questions about managerial style, incentive 
structures, how managers deal with risk taking and failure, and the mission of the 
organization. Determinants of change also inform assessment of where the NPS is in the 
process of change. Importantly, this research contributes to the eighth determinant of 
successful change by increasing understanding the subsystems of the organization. 
2.3.5 How Does One Intervene in a System? 
	  
 Once there is a general understanding of the components of a system and how they 
work together, only then is it productive to attempt to change the system. Without an 
understanding of learning disabilities and archetypes that may be preventing the system 
from changing, managers often push the wrong “levers,” so to speak. Managers sometimes 
push aggressive change efforts, and then are baffled by the resistance to change. By 
examining the underlying structure, culture, mental models, learning disabilities, and 
archetypes that exist in the NPS, managers will be able to more effectively affect change if 
they wish (Meadows, 1999). 
 An important component of systems thinking is that of leverage points, or parts of a 
complex system where a minor change in one aspect can result in major changes 
throughout. Leverage points in complex systems are rarely intuitive, but if they are, 
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managers use them the wrong way, unintentionally exacerbating the issue they’re trying to 
solve (Meadows, 1999). For example, Jay Forrester illustrated this point in the context of a 
discussion around solving major world problems. While many tout growth as a solution to 
poverty, unemployment and hunger, Forrester demonstrated that what was needed was 
slower or sometimes even negative growth. Growth was indeed the leverage point, but in 
Forrester’s case study, world leaders were pushing in the wrong direction (Forrester, 1971; 
Meadows, 1999).  
Because they are often counterintuitive, leverage points can be difficult to find. 
Meadows has identified twelve places within a system, or leverage points, where 
intervention is most effective. These points increase in effectiveness, or in the amount of 
leverage they bear, as one moves from physical attributes, to feedbacks, to system rules, 
and mental models and paradigms. For example, the point with the least amount of 
leverage, yet the most popular with managers, is termed “Constants, parameters, numbers” 
(Meadows, 1999, p. 5). This refers to the surface-level, often numeric details in a system, 
such as air quality standards, wage rates, or the acreage of land set aside for conservation. 
These are adjustable, but they’re not powerful leverage points because changing them 
rarely changes behavior. A more powerful leverage point, for example, would be 
“information flows” (Meadows, 1999, p. 12). Creating information feedback in a system is 
much more influential than the physical structure of the system itself. One of the most 
powerful leverage points is the leverage of mental models, or what Meadows terms “the 
mindset or paradigm out of which a system arises” (Meadows, 1999, p. 17). These could 
include shared assumptions (i.e. mental models) like “growth is good,” as in Forrester’s 
model above, or underlying assumptions about the role of science or the purpose of an 
organization (Meadows, 1999). If the NPS truly wants to transform into a more adaptive 
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organization, or one that is able to adopt the ideas in Revisiting Leopold, then Meadow’s 
concept of leverage points can help identify those places where a relatively small action 
will create a much greater change in the NPS as a system.  
Together, the literature on diffusion of innovation theory, systems thinking, learning 
organizations, and organizational culture has led to questions about how a more adaptive 
organization can or cannot be attained, what structural and cultural barriers may need to be 
mitigated for the transition to occur, and who in the organization to interview.  
2.4. Summary 
	  
From a review of the literature discussed in this proposal, it is apparent that 
organizational change in bureaucratic, hierarchical organizations is difficult because their 
systems are often cumbersome and inefficient (Osborne, 1993) and employees may not 
believe in the ability of the organization to change because of constraining rules and 
regulations (Jones et al., 2005; Parker & Bradley, 2000). Revisiting Leopold proposes goals 
that speak to a new management paradigm for the NPS. Literature on scientific paradigms 
inform questions about the nature of change in scientific approaches, and postnormal 
science drives question about the role of science, values, and uncertainty in decision-
making. Systems thinking and resilience inform questions and analysis around how 
Revisiting Leopold is perceived and understood, and the concept of learning organizations 
supports the assessment of structural and cultural attributes of the organization, as well as 
patterns, mental models, and feedbacks that affect the ability of the NPS to embrace a new 
paradigm. This conceptual framework leads to the following more specific research 
questions: 
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Kuhn, Popper, and Postnormal Science: 
• Do managers believe the ideas in Revisiting Leopold represent a paradigm shift or 
an ideological shift for the organization? 
o If so, what would be the impetus for change and where would it come from? 
• What roles do science, political, values, and uncertainty play in decision-making? 
 
Systems Thinking and Resilience: 
• Do NPS managers understand the properties of this new ideology? 
• How do managers perceive Revisiting Leopold and how (or do they) envision its 
implementation? 
• How do they envision dealing with complexity and change? 
• How do they define and address coupled human-natural systems? 
• What does a resilient NPS system look like, and is it possible to attain? 
• Are managers thinking and working at broader scales, and what are the incentives 
or disincentives to doing so? 
 
Learning Organizations: 
• What are the structural challenges to implementing Revisiting Leopold? 
o What are the mental models and learning disabilities that may be barriers to 
adaptation? 
o What are the system archetypes that may be barriers to adaptation? 
• What are the cultural barriers to implementing Revisiting Leopold? 
o Can a mission-driven organization facilitate this kind of change? 
o How is success perceived in the NPS and what is its related incentive 
system? 
o How are cultural barriers to change, such as the ability for managers to 
accept uncertainty and take risks, incentivized in the NPS? 
 
The specific research questions above, derived from the literature, directly inform interview 
questions. The interview guides, for both managers and contributors to Revisiting Leopold, 
are included in Appendix A and Appendix B respectively.  
The conceptual framework also contributes to data analysis, specifically by 
informing the development of themes and coding. The analytical approach in Chapters 5, 6, 
and 7 relies primarily on Senge’s concepts of the “iceberg,” mental models, learning 
disabilities, and archetypes, as well as Meadows’ concept of leverage points.  
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
	  
3.1 Research Approach 
	  
This research is largely exploratory. Exploratory studies are conducted when 
relatively little is known about a topic, often due to its novelty (Singleton & Straits, 2010). 
In this case, the goal is to better understand the structure, culture, and ideology of the NPS 
as a system. Ultimately, the results of this study may inform the top levels of management 
within the NPS about the status of diffusion and adoption of the concepts in Revisiting 
Leopold, the extent to which employees possess a shared vision of this new paradigm, and 
an understanding of the NPS as a system at multiple levels. For on-the-ground managers, it 
is hoped that this study will demonstrate the need for such a change as well as create the 
platform for further dialogue about the concepts in the Revisiting Leopold report, 
implementation strategies, and barriers to change within the NPS. Finally, this research will 
help NPS managers at all levels to better understand their roles in fostering a learning 
organization, or how they can create an environment within the agency for learning, 
creativity, adaptation, and maximizing the achievement of their mission and goals.  
In qualitative research, all data is interpreted through the researcher, and “all human 
activity, including research, is accomplished from a specific standpoint” (Warren & 
Karner, 2010, p. 9). Therefore, it is necessary to identify one’s position in relation to the 
topic. As an employee of the NPS, I am approaching this study with prior knowledge, 
biases, and mental models. A conscious effort has been made to detach myself from the 
data to the extent possible and to and rely only upon data obtained through this study. In 
addition, my committee chair has reviewed excerpts of data interpretation to ensure the 
validity.  
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As a qualitative study, this research is also inductive, meaning that “concepts [are] 
derived from the data gathered” (Warren & Karner, 2010, p. 9) and findings are linked to 
specific theories (Warren & Karner, 2010). In this case, while it relies upon a conceptual 
framework based on systems thinking, organizational change literature, and other 
disciplines, it also employs grounded theory, which develops theory derived from the 
qualitative data gathered, rather than deriving theory from existing assumptions. A 
grounded approach encourages a loosely structured research design to enable theoretical 
ideas to surface from interview data over the progression of the study (Singleton & Straits, 
2010).  
In order to gather comparable information from respondents and retain the 
flexibility and openness of a grounded theory approach, the study utilizes semistructured 
interviews. Semistructured interviews have specific subtopics and goals yet allow a certain 
amount of liberty in how they are met (Singleton & Straits, 2010). This type of interview is 
also the most appropriate to the research approach and conceptual framework, given the 
grounded theory approach and the need to illicit responses from interviewees that directly 
address the issues in the literature and conceptual framework associated with organizational 
behavior and change.  
3.2 Sampling Frame and Strategy 
	  
As the nature of field research typically concentrates on interactive social 
relationships and organizations, it usually entails the nonrandom selection of interviewees. 
Probability sampling, in which all respondents are randomly chosen and have a known 
probability of being selected, has the benefit of reducing biases and lends a level of 
generalizability to the population. However, the descriptive nature of this research does not 
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necessitate generalization; rather, the goal is to augment the informational value of 
respondents by increasing variation (Singleton & Straits, 2010). According to Singleton 
and Straits, “the delicate operation of entering the field – of locating suitable observation 
sites and making fruitful contacts – also necessitates nonrandom selection. Convenience, 
accessibility, and happenstance by and large determine where researchers can begin to 
make observations… and whom they will find most informative” (Singleton & Straits, 
2010, p. 360). The authors also note that in the beginning stages of exploring a problem, 
when the goal is to gain more information about the issue in question, probability sampling 
may not be necessary. Rather, choosing a range of subjects nonrandomly is adequate 
(Singleton & Straits, 2010).  
While one of the primary research questions in this study concerns the level of 
understanding and adoption of the Revisiting Leopold report in the NPS, this question is 
posed in the context of organizational change. Therefore, people in the NPS with leverage 
to instigate or achieve organizational change were specifically targeted. Diffusion of 
innovations theory suggests that when a new idea is adopted by an organization, members 
of the organization fall into one of five categories of innovativeness: the (1) innovators 
themselves, (2) early adopters, (3) early majority, (4) late majority, and (5) laggards 
(Rogers, 2003). Thus, in the case of this research project, diffusion theory supports a 
sampling frame of early adopters, or the opinion leaders in the organization that serve as 
role models for other individuals and have the most leverage to instigate change. Early 
adopters are respected and in a central position in the communication network of a system 
(Rogers, 2003). This group has the most influence on how this new ideology described in 
Revisiting Leopold is perceived, understood, and adopted. Peter Senge’s and Donella 
Meadow’s work in the field of systems thinking also supports this approach. According to 
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Senge and Meadows, the people who are most likely to affect change in an organization are 
those who have the ability to influence mental models, or deeply ingrained assumptions or 
beliefs that affect how one sees the world (Meadows, 1999; Senge, 2006).  
In the NPS, the group of people who fit this description are employees who are 
division chiefs within a park, management assistants, deputy superintendents, 
superintendents or higher. These people have the ability to set park policy, are usually 
opinion leaders, and are well respected by other members of the NPS. They are in a central 
position in the communication network because they are familiar with policy from higher 
echelons of the NPS, but are also in touch with local issues in parks. Other NPS employees 
included in the sampling frame are those who work at regional offices or at the national 
level. These employees also have a high amount of leverage within the organization, 
oftentimes more than park level personnel. Additionally, contributors to Revisiting Leopold 
were included to provide additional insight into the thinking behind the report and how 
they envision the agency adopting this new ideology. 
The spectrum of employees within the organization ranges from low GS, or pay-
grade, levels within parks to the Director of the NPS. The decision to target employees at 
the level of a division chief or higher results in the loss of some insight into how well the 
policies described in Revisiting Leopold are trickling down through the organization. 
However, this group of people is less likely to be able to speak to how well Revisiting 
Leopold is understood, and would be able to provide less insight on cultural and structural 
barriers to organizational change. Finally, even if lower level employees fully understood 
the ideology proposed in Revisiting Leopold and believed it should be implemented, they 
have less ability to affect change.   
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Given the levels of employees in the sampling frame (park division chiefs and 
higher), efforts were made to ensure that respondents represented a diversity of geographic 
locations, offices, divisions, and park sizes. Generalizability is not a primary concern in this 
study; the method of snowball sampling, explained below, favors data richness at the 
expense of generalizability. However, obtaining a diversity of responses is important so 
that the range of responses captures the range of opinions that exist in the NPS. Because 
local economics and politics play a fundamental role in a park’s social ecological context, 
six of the seven park regions were represented in the sample. However, most respondents 
have previously worked in other office or parks in the system, and with previous work 
experiences included, all seven regions were represented.     
Due to the nature of the research question at hand, this study largely targets 
managers who make difficult, value-laden, politicized decisions within complex social 
ecological environments (Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1993). While managers at parks of all sizes 
are facing these challenges, it is the managers at high-profile parks that are most often 
forced to confront this reality. Because of this, many of the parks represented in the 
sampling frame are relatively high profile parks. However, several smaller parks are 
included to create a sample that is more representative of the agency as a whole.  
For the purposes of this study, the sampling frame was primarily limited to 
respondents who currently work at natural resource based parks (in addition to regional and 
national offices) because although Revisiting Leopold calls for the same principles to be 
applied to cultural resources, and cultural history certainly transcends park boundaries, the 
scope of this study is largely limited to natural resource management. In addition to 
regional and national offices, ten natural resource parks were represented by respondents 
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currently working in those parks, and twenty-seven additional park units of all types were 
represented by respondents who had worked there in the past. 
 Due to the exploratory nature of this research, as well as the necessity for entrée 
with respondents, this study employed purposive and snowball sampling. In purposive 
sampling, “the investigator relies on his or her expert judgment to select units that are 
‘representative’ or ‘typical’ of the population” (Singleton & Straits, 2010). The goal of this 
research is to collect as much rich, informative data from respondents as possible. 
Interviews began with seven initial interviewees with whom the researcher had entrée that 
represent a diversity of geographic regions, park sizes, and levels in the organization 
(within the sampling frame), and that the researcher believed would provide valuable data 
and insight on the topic. Following these interviews, snowball sampling was employed to 
identify additional respondents, in which respondents were asked to recommend others 
who might be able to provide rich data on the topic.  Midway through the interview 
process, the diversity of parks, offices, geographic locations and vocations was assessed. At 
that point, four additional respondents were purposively selected to ensure geographic and 
vocational diversity in the sample.  
The purpose of this method is to identify interviewees that will provide detailed, 
thoughtful responses. However, snowball sampling introduces bias by increasing the 
likelihood that recommended respondents are similar to the respondent that recommended 
them (Singleton & Straits, 2010). To mitigate this bias and avoid a situation in which all 
respondents agreed with one another, requests for other interviewees were carefully 
worded. Rather than asking, “Who else do you think I should talk to about this?” 
respondents were asked, “Who is taking steps to implement this, and who might disagree 
with you or the ideas in this report?”   
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In total, twenty-three respondents were interviewed. In their current positions, they 
represented six of seven NPS regions; with all NPS career experience included, 
respondents represented all regions. Slightly less than half of respondents currently work at 
the park unit level, approximately 20% work at the regional level, and about 30% work at 
the national level. While the term “manager” is used throughout this thesis synonymously 
with “respondents,” because all respondents interviewed make management decisions on 
some level, respondents represented a variety of roles within the NPS, including 
superintendents, division chiefs, physical or biological scientists, social scientists, visitor 
use specialists, planners, rangers, economists, or regional coordinators. In addition, two 
people who were involved in the publication of Revisiting Leopold were interviewed.  
Snowball sampling and subsequent interviews continued until data saturation was 
reached. At this point, interviews did not lend new ideas or perspectives to the data; data 
from the last several respondents began to replicate ideas from other respondents. 
Additionally, when respondents were asked to suggest others to interview, many of those 
people respondents suggested had already been interviewed.  
3.3 Data Collection 
	  
As mentioned above, twenty-three semistructured interviews were conducted before 
data saturation was reached. Interviews typically lasted between forty and seventy minutes. 
Semistructured interviews have specific subtopics and goals yet allow a certain amount of 
liberty in how they are met (Singleton & Straits, 2010).  This method allowed the collection 
of comparable information from respondents, yet retained the flexibility for the interviewer 
to ask probing or follow-up questions in order to gain richer data or clarify responses.   
Organizational Adaptation in an Era of Complexity, Uncertainty, and Change 
	  
	   46	  
Interview guides for both the contributors to Revisiting Leopold and general 
respondents are included in the appendix. An interview guide “stems from the general topic 
of investigation and from ideas and hypotheses that emerge in the field” (Singleton & 
Straits, 2010, p. 368). It consists of a series of questions designed to generate data that 
addresses guiding research questions and data that are grounded in the conceptual theories 
described in this proposal. The interview guide was pretested to ensure that the questions 
were optimally phrased and sequenced to generate data that address research questions and 
put the subject at ease. Additionally, after the first three interviews, phrasing of a few 
questions was slightly adjusted, but not to the extent that the meaning was altered (Warren 
& Karner, 2010).  
Most interviews were conducted over the phone, and three were conducted in-
person. The interviewer explained confidentiality procedures to each respondent at the 
beginning of the interview, and obtained verbal permission to record it. For this study, 
confidentiality protection was particularly important. The primary ethical consideration 
associated with this research is the potential for respondent’s answers to compromise their 
job, status in the workplace, or future job prospects if their responses were to be viewed by 
any one of their colleagues as controversial or deviant from NPS policy or norms. 
Therefore, the utmost effort was taken to protect the identity of respondents. Employee’s 
names, park names, and specific resource issues that could be linked to a particular park 
were omitted from the transcripts. Position titles were also omitted when necessary.  
 Finally, a remaining methodological concern regards the biases introduced by 
asking the respondents to read Revisiting Leopold before the interview. On one hand, 
asking respondents to read the document before the interview limited the ability to assess 
the level to which this document has permeated the organization. This approach could bias 
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results by suggesting that more respondents were familiar with the report than they would 
have been otherwise. On the other hand, to obtain quality data, interviewees must have 
knowledge about the topic and research question. If respondents had not read the report, 
they would not have not have been able to provide reactions to it, discuss their 
understanding of the concepts it proposes, and would have a reduced ability to speak to 
challenges or barriers to implementing these ideas within the NPS. To address this 
problem, respondents were asked whether they had read the report before being contacted 
for an interview. All but one respondent had read Revisiting Leopold prior to being 
contacted for an interview.  
3.4 Data Analysis 
 Interviews were transcribed by a private transcriber, who has taken measures to 
protect the data and then deleted the audio files. Transcripts were then checked for 
accuracy and uploaded into NVivo, a qualitative analysis software program, to enable 
coding and analysis.  
 Data analysis entails “the search for patterns in data and for ideas that help explain 
the existence of those patterns” (Bernard, 1994, p. 360 in Singleton & Straits, 2010, p. 
385). After reading and rereading transcripts, common themes from interviews emerged 
from the data. The data was then coded according to these themes in NVivio. Any nuances 
of coding rational and thought processes were captured in memos. “Memos are small 
pieces of analysis, usually a paragraph or two, that capture emergent ideas that help make 
sense of the reality one is encountering” (Singleton & Straits, 2010, p. 386). 
Patterns and relationships emerged from themes and interview data, and then were 
interpreted and analyzed according to the conceptual framework described in the previous 
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chapter.  All of the data and quotes cannot be included in the results and analysis, so data 
analysis involved an extensive process of reading and rereading transcripts and analyzing 
themes across interviews. A significant effort was made to accurately represent the full 
range of viewpoints and accurately portray the degree to which other respondents did or did 
not share those viewpoints. In some cases, where one sentiment was expressed by many 
respondents, one or two excerpts that expressed the idea most fully and clearly were used 
to represent the idea. Occasionally, a number of short succinct quotes are used to 
demonstrate either a broad range of viewpoints or extensive agreement around a particular 
idea. Excerpts were also chosen carefully with their full context in mind.  
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Chapter 4: Results 
 
Throughout the course of data collection, 23 NPS managers were interviewed, 
including, scientists, division chiefs, superintendents, and planners at the park, regional, 
and national level. From interview data, it becomes possible to discern whether this sample 
of the NPS conforms to the paradigm described by the Revisiting Leopold report. 
Specifically, have the managers interviewed moved from a positivist, reductionist, 
Progressive-era paradigm towards a systems thinking paradigm? Do early adopters in the 
NPS have a shared vision of the new paradigm described in Revisiting Leopold? 
Fernandez and Rainey (2006) present eight determinants of successful 
implementation of organizational change in the public sector, the primary components of 
which have been echoed throughout the field (Kotter, 2007; Lovegrove, Ulosevich, & 
Warner, 2010). Two of these components of successful change include effectively 
communicating the need for change and building internal support and participation 
(Fernandez & Rainey, 2006). The systems approach takes this a step further, maintaining 
that in order to become a learning organization, members must have a shared vision that is 
the driving force that provides focus and energy for learning. As Senge puts it, a shared 
vision “is the answer to the question, ‘What do we want to create?’” (Senge, 2006, p. 192). 
Revisiting Leopold attempts to inspire a shared vision for what this new paradigm would 
look like in the NPS. Therefore, it becomes relevant to assess whether the Revisiting 
Leopold report has successfully communicated a compelling vision for how and why the 
NPS must transform itself and whether managers support the ideas in the report.  
The iceberg model further illustrates that to solve problems and improve an 
organization, managers often look to immediate events occurring around them. However, 
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like an iceberg, most of what explains and drives events is “underwater,” or unseen. It is 
more useful to examine reoccurring patterns and trends that drive events, and more useful 
still to examine the structures that contribute to these patterns.  Ultimately, underneath 
patterns and structures are mental models, or fundamental, sometimes unknown, beliefs 
and assumptions. The further one descends down the iceberg, the greater one’s leverage to 
change the system (Senge et al., 2008). If the NPS is moving into a new paradigm of 
systems thinking, of embracing change, uncertainty, and complexity, it must not only 
demonstrate this in the form of events and actions, or positive receptivity to the report, but 
it must also possess a shared vision, as well as the structure, culture, and mental models to 
support it.    
The following section is a general description of the types and variation of 
responses from interviewees, organized according to Senge’s iceberg model. This section 
will first discuss the general event-level reactions and receptivity to the report itself. Do the 
managers interviewed understand and support the components of this new paradigm? Next, 
patterns and trends in the NPS that facilitate or prevent the realization of this new paradigm 
will be described, followed by a description of the structural and cultural characteristics of 
the NPS that affect its ability to be a learning organization. Finally, several mental models 
that exist within the NPS emerged from the data that are likely underlying drivers of the 
system. While respondents were asked to speak to the nature of the organization as a 
whole, it is important to remember that the data and analysis in the following chapters 
represents the views of a sample of managers, and cannot necessarily be generalized to the 
organization as a whole. 
4.1 What are the reactions to Revisiting Leopold? 
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Shared visions are critical to a learning organization because generative learning, or 
transforming an organization into one that is more responsive and creative, “will seem 
abstract and meaningless until people become excited about a vision they truly want to 
accomplish” (Senge, 2006 p. 192). Vision, in other words, establishes an overarching goal. 
The report presents an overarching goal, but in order for employees to build a shared vision 
around it, they must first understand the concepts in it. This section describes data 
pertaining to (1) manager’s general reactions to the report, (2) level of agreement about the 
need for change, and (3) understanding of the fundamental concepts presented in Revisiting 
Leopold. 
When asked, “What was your understanding of [Revisiting Leopold,] and what did 
you think of it?” the most common response, from approximately one third of respondents, 
was that it is largely a positive and needed statement that recognizes that our social and 
ecological environment is complex and changing rapidly and unpredictably, particularly 
with regard to climate change. “I think there was a need for it…The idea that people seem 
to have fixated from [the] Leopold [report], this vignette of primitive America, was pretty 
outdated, and most park managers and staff understood that” (R12), remarked one 
manager. Some of these respondents highlighted the need for the NPS to be more flexible 
and adaptable, or to manage at broader scales, as positive and necessary components of this 
report; several of these respondents remarked that the report was timely.   
On the other hand, almost as many respondents remarked that they perceived the 
report to be very general, lacking in both detail and specific guidance regarding how these 
ideas might be implemented. Of this group of respondents, two remarked that 
implementing the ideas in this report would mean different things in different parks. For 
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example, one of these respondents remarked that terms such as “ecosystem integrity” (R1) 
are too general and can mean a variety of different things in different places. Another said,  
“They talk about managing for ecosystem integrity, and …it’s really hard to 
understand what it would mean in the case of an ecosystem that’s undergoing 
very rapid change…So I’m not quite sure how we are going to accomplish that. 
On one hand, Revisiting Leopold says embrace change and sort of go with the 
punches, and on the other it says, ‘But also pure historic integrity.’ I think those 
two are contradictory.” (R11) 
Two other respondents would have liked to see the report provide more guidance on 
and address climate change more specifically. “I would have loved a very, very, strong 
statement about, ‘This is what the policy of the National park Service should be looking at 
in the face of climate change as it relates especially to wildlife and vegetation species” 
(R7). While almost a third of the respondents perceived the report as too broad and lacking 
specific guidance, not all of them believe this is problematic. Several of these respondents 
noted that the report was probably abstract on purpose, that it was just meant to be a broad 
philosophical statement, or that the level of detail is sufficient until the implementation 
team (a team of NPS employees charged with prioritizing items for implementation) can 
provide further guidance. “If I have a gripe with the report, it is that it is very broad and 
general in its recommendations,” one respondent explained, but “it is important to have 
broad statements about philosophical direction…so even if it’s not very specific about what 
next steps might be…there’s still a lot of value in explicitly recognizing that this 
perspective should be what drives the direction of the agency” (R16). In general, it appears 
that while many managers understand the need for this report, they aren’t clear about how 
it will be implemented. As Senge points out, a shared vision “will seem abstract and 
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meaningless until people become excited about a vision they truly want to accomplish” 
(Senge, 2006 p. 192).  
There appears to be a lack of enthusiasm from approximately a third of respondents 
about this vision, perhaps driven by confusion about the new paradigm that this report 
entails. A few respondents thought that implementation will come in the form of policy 
changes, but due to the diversity of parks and ecosystems across the National Park System, 
it would be difficult to make a “one-size fits all” policy. One respondent also noted that it’s 
difficult to transform abstract philosophical statements into policy. This type of reaction, 
combined with concern about terms applying differently in different places, reflects a lack 
of understanding about the dynamic complexity that is an inherent component of this new 
paradigm. Managers are used to thinking in terms of detail complexity, a characteristic of 
the positivist paradigm, rather than dynamic complexity, in which “an action has one set of 
consequences locally and very different set of consequences in another part of the system… 
[and] when obvious interventions produces non obvious consequences” (Senge, 2006 p. 
71).  
Slightly less than a third of respondents see the report as a reexamination of the 
underlying principles and goals of the original Leopold report, an attempt to broaden the 
focus and make it more relevant. One respondent thinks that it’s both a “natural thought 
progression in terms of what the original Leopold Report said” (R7), and an “affirmation of 
the original Leopold Report” (R7).  
A few respondents remarked that they felt the NPS was already doing many of the 
things in the report, such as recognizing that ecosystems are changing and using best 
available science. Two respondents remarked that many people in the NPS already 
understand or are trying to implement the ideas expressed in the report, and the real 
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constraint is not a lack of understanding, but budgets, or “the wherewithal to do some of 
these things” (R11).  
Several interviewees focused on the report’s emphasis on science. While some 
viewed this emphasis positively, some were more skeptical, noting that scientific 
information “is rarely unambiguous” (R9), and that many decisions are political, and 
science often only plays a small part. As another respondent put it, “Data doesn’t make 
decisions” (R19). Interestingly, while three respondents highlighted the report’s integration 
of natural and cultural resources, one respondent thought it should have been more 
“multifaceted, [and] interdisciplinary” (R2), remarking that it was written “through a 
scientific lens,” and “ignore[d] the values, the social values that are associated with the 
natural and cultural resources that the report was focusing on” (R2). From these responses, 
it appears that some respondents are demonstrating an understanding of postnormal science 
and the role of social values in a coupled human-natural system.  
When asked about how they see the report being implemented, employees gave a 
broad range of responses. Many respondents, however, deferred to others in the NPS and 
seemed to be employing a “wait and see approach.” Six respondents cited the 
implementation team and several others don’t know how the report will be implemented or 
believed it was up to others, either more broadly in the NPS, their superiors, or 
“champions” within the organization. 
While there does appear to be a broad variety of reactions to the report, 
demonstrating the lack of a shared vision for what this new paradigm might look like, a few 
managers do appear to be thinking about the uncertainty involved in scientific data and the 
influence of social values and politics on decision-making.  
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Equally important as a shared understanding of the concepts in the report is a shared 
understanding of the need for change. Therefore, managers must also believe that the ideas 
in this report do in fact represent a change, or an ideological shift for the NPS. Jones, 
Jimmieson, and Griffith (2005) maintain that an important component of organizational 
change in the public sector is the concept of readiness for change, which they define as “the 
extent to which employees hold positive views about the need for organizational change 
(i.e. change acceptance), as well as the extent to which employees believe that such 
changes are likely to have positive implications for themselves and the wider organization” 
(Jones et al., 2005, p. 362).  
The overwhelming majority of respondents did in fact see the ideas in Revisiting 
Leopold as a needed change or shift in ideology for the NPS. Of these, six respondents 
believed that adopting the ideas in this report would be a necessary paradigm shift, while 
four thought it to be a needed “evolution” (R5; R7; R10; R16) of thought.  
Three respondents admitted that Revisiting Leopold represented somewhat of a 
change, but hesitated to go as far as the majority of respondents. Two of these believed that 
while the thinking and understanding of individuals has changed, the organization as a 
whole is slow to catch up. “Ideologically it’s there, it’s changed, and it’s for the better” one 
respondent remarked, “but physically there are definitely some gaps” (R22). While 
individual members of the sample may be there ideologically, it is clear that the 
organization as a whole is not. While most respondents were receptive of the report as a 
whole, there was some confusion about concepts such as resilience, dealing with 
complexity and change, and the intersection of social and ecological systems, specifically 
with regard to the role of the NPS in an era of climate change.  
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Some of the widest variety and discrepancies in responses pertained to the topic of 
resiliency. Slightly less than a third of respondents admitted to not knowing or not 
understanding what resilience means in terms of on-the-ground management or in terms of 
management policies. Most of these interviewees understood the concept, but not its 
implementation. As one respondent put it, resilience is “interesting on a philosophical level, 
but when it comes down to park management it doesn’t mean much…it’s one step from 
action” (R6). 
An equal number of respondents, slightly less than a third, pointed to increasing 
connectivity and collaboration with partners as a strategy to increase resilience. The 
remaining responses were varied, and included suggestions such as removing stressors that 
we have the ability to manage and taking “no-regrets actions” (R16) (e.g. removing 
pollution or non-native species), improving adaptive management embracing dynamic 
complexity, increasing redundancy in ecological and cultural systems, and increasing 
public education, so that the public can help the NPS prioritize the most important aspects 
of systems.   
Interestingly, one respondent remarked that the word resiliency is often misused, 
and what managers “really mean is delayed onset to change” (R1). A few other respondents 
may not have understood the concept themselves, suggesting that managing for resilience 
would mean applying the same concept as zoning, or managing for different goals for 
different areas, or that managing for resilience “doesn’t require any human management” 
(R9). Once scientist understood the concept but viewed it quite narrowly, only as it applied 
to his or her field, remarking that “I don’t think you can look at it as a resilient national 
park. You’d look at it as an attempt to create resiliency primarily in the dominant plant 
communities on the landscape” (R20). There seems to be a wide range of understandings of 
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the concept, and only a few respondents recognized its application to the social-ecological 
system as a whole. For example, respondent 20 only thinks of resiliency within the context 
of plant communities. When respondent 19 was asked about what a resilient national park 
system would look like, he or she replied, “Hmm. Are you talking, like, resource resiliency, 
like plants and animals, or people resiliency” (R19)? These reactions demonstrate that not 
all managers understand resiliency in a systemic way.   
On the other hand, most respondents did generally recognize the interconnectedness 
of social and ecologic systems, or coupled human-natural systems, largely with respect to 
climate change. “The reality is that to try to assess nature without human intervention is – I 
don’t know if it’s possible or even fair, because the reality is that we are part of that 
system” (R8). However, there seemed to be a general discomfort or lack of confidence 
from most respondents regarding what this means for NPS policy, especially in terms of 
what is considered natural and what is considered anthropogenic. As one respondent put it,  
“We’ve tied ourselves in knots over that [coupled human-natural systems] right 
now. It was pretty easy until climate change became accepted. We were managing 
for natural, and if we could detect anthropogenic influences, our goal was to weed 
them out…I think we, the Park Service, are very much stuck with, then what are 
we managing for?” (R11) 
This reaction demonstrates that events such as climate change and the publication of 
Revisiting Leopold are causing some people to question their underlying mental models. 
Because of the variety of reactions to the report and the amount of confusion 
surrounding the concepts presented within it, it is apparent that managers in this sample are 
lacking a shared vision of the new paradigm presented in Revisiting Leopold. In addition to 
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general reactions to the report, several patterns emerged from the data that demonstrate 
difficulties in breaking out of the paradigm in which the NPS is currently operating.  
4.2 What are the Patterns and Trends in the System? 
	  
Below the event level on Senge’s iceberg model are patterns and trends (Senge et 
al., 2008). Sometimes events are part of larger patterns or underlying trends occurring in 
the NPS that could be affecting the ability of the organization to become more adaptable. 
This section will address patterns and trends that emerged from the interviews, including 
dwindling budgets and staff, staff turnover, a pattern of negative consequences in the event 
of failure, and the growing popularity of collaboration. 
4.2.1 Dwindling Budgets and Staff 
	  
Almost all respondents highlighted budgets as a barrier to implementing the ideas in 
the Revisiting Leopold report. While funding mechanisms are also a structural barrier, there 
is a trend towards declining budgets and reduced staff, and a strong pattern emerged of 
managers wanting to accomplish various items in Revisiting Leopold but lacking the 
funding.  
Most respondents saw dwindling budgets as the primary barrier to implementing the 
ideas in the report, and saw a disconnect between what the report calls for (e.g. more 
partnerships and collaboration, monitoring, increasing scientific capacity) and the way 
budgets are currently allocated. Many highlighted the fact that the agency spends the 
majority (approximately 75% according to interviewees) of their budget on visitor services, 
leaving little room for resources and monitoring.  
One superintendent highlighted that there are barriers to working towards long-term 
goals, because   
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“We are in such crisis management, day after day, trying to get through what’s 
being asked of us, either on the ground in the park or by regional or 
Washington offices or whoever. There’s a lot of reporting that comes at 
us…For example…we just got through the FY14 budget exercise, which was 
the 5% cut we took last year, and two days after we get through with it they 
say, ‘By the way, you need to take an additional 3%,’ so we’ve got to go back 
and redo it all. That kind of stuff takes a huge amount of time. You don’t have 
time to focus on the long-term stuff, you’re just trying to do the report of the 
day.” (R4) 
Park staff, with reduced budgets and capacity, seem to spend all of their money and energy 
“doing the proverbial putting out of fires” (R22) and trying to simply keep their heads 
above water.  
The funding cycles are a challenge to working long term, both from Congress for 
the agency as a whole and internal funding projects. Most of the appropriations are single-
year appropriations, so unless an employee is carefully making sure that there’s money set 
aside for long-term monitoring and tracking it closely, it can fall through the cracks after a 
couple of years. While the NPS’ goal is long-term conservation, this is contradicted by the 
budget itself, because three-quarters of the budget is for day-to-day operations, several 
employees pointed out. While some managers would like to conduct long-term monitoring, 
for example, it’s “statistically challenging and very expensive” (R20). It’s much easier to 
garner funding to monitor “sexy” (R1) resources, which may or may not be the most 
important. Similarly, there’s a lot of “crisis award” happening, like “saving somebody’s 
life, diving into the burning building and dragging somebody out…We ought to reward 
folks because the building didn’t burn down to begin with” (R4). 
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Additionally, it is more difficult to place monetary value on natural resources than 
physical assets. “The feedback loops associated with visitor services tend to be pretty tight 
and direct” (R18), explains one respondent.  
“We have defined assets, those assets have needed outcomes, those outcomes 
have projected budgets, those budgets then interface with a Congress loop that 
gives resources and feeds back into it…Whereas natural and cultural systems’ 
feedback loops are more variable because they’re not as well defined and we’re 
focused more on detail than we are the dynamic outcome.” (R18)  
This respondent demonstrates an ability think systemically about feedbacks and dynamic 
complexity. In doing so, he or she highlights several deeper processes at play: the nature of 
funding allocation, a weak information feedback loop with regard to resources, and deeper 
cultural tendencies or mental models around how assets and resources are valued.  
4.2.2 Staff Turnover 
	  
In addition to funding mechanisms, the nature of hiring and advancement through 
the organization create patterns that make it difficult to both adapt the ideas in Revisiting 
Leopold and become a learning organization. Management cycles often only last several 
years, and staff turnover rates can be high as employees seek to move up in the 
organization by applying for new positions. Therefore, it’s difficult to consistently apply 
science and maintain continuity in science-based decisions. When new staff or 
superintendents come in, they may not have the same understanding of or buy-in on the 
decision-making processes that occurred before their arrival.  One respondent, when 
reacting to the report’s recommendation to expand the role of science, explained this 
recurring problem: 
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“It takes a lot of money to monitor things. Somebody’s got to do it, do the 
field work, write up the report, communicate the results to the park’s 
management team. I’ve seen the management team here at the park go 
through at least I’ll say half an iteration to two-thirds of an iteration, and when 
new folks come in…they didn’t go through the decision-making process that 
we went through before, so they don’t really have the same feel or the same 
buy-in for…decisions that were made in the past, and it may not be as high a 
priority for them now” (R12). 
In other words, loss of institutional knowledge and shifting baselines are common problems 
and recurring patterns throughout the NPS that are likely driven by structural attributes of 
the human resources system. 
4.2.3 Negative Consequences for Failure 
	  
Just as staff turnover appears to be making it difficult for managers to apply science 
and learn over time, other patterns are also making it difficult for managers to learn and be 
adaptive. For example, another pattern that emerged from interviews relates to how risk is 
perceived, incentivized, and dealt with. In general, the NPS culture is relatively risk-averse. 
Some of this risk aversion seems be driven by the public. The public doesn’t like to hear 
that the agency is uncertain about what’s going to happen, even when the agency is 
applying the best available science, a respondent explains.  “I think our leaders get really 
nervous when we take a lot of risk, especially when it doesn’t turn out well…nobody likes 
surprises, they always want to be informed, and I agree, I don’t like surprises either” (R4), 
another interviewee remarks. When management decisions don’t turn out well, employees 
suffer a barrage of complaints from the public, and may be relocated to a low profile, less 
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favorable position. This also creates a disincentive to take an action that may protect 
resources at the expense of visitor satisfaction. “The visitors write letters, and of course the 
resources can’t, but that’s what gets the attention, trying to make people happy, trying to 
soothe ruffled feathers, rather than look at what the issue was and what we did to try to 
protect the park” (R4). 
Another societal trend occurring in the system is an increasingly litigious culture. In 
one sense, more is at stake for managers when making high-profile or risky decisions. As a 
result, science is playing more and more of a role in justifying decisions and reducing risk 
in an increasingly litigious environment. 
Several managers brought up adaptive management as a way that the agency deals 
with risk and uncertainty in this context. One of these described both an “active” and a 
“passive” (R14) form of adaptive management, but another respondent believes the agency 
is not doing adaptive management in the true sense of the term. “You would find that 
[managers] would all define adaptive management as what is known in the literature as 
‘managing adaptively.’ They would say ‘We put management actions into place and we 
monitor what happens, and we might make changes in the future.’ What human being 
didn’t do that in the past” (R1)? 
The NPS also accounts for risk and uncertainty by employing the precautionary 
principle, which one respondent believes will become more important in the future, 
especially considering discussions around manipulations and interventions. Another 
believes that this principle is generally only applied when dealing with things that the NPS 
deems “natural.” “At the same time, we have not been particularly precautionary when it 
come to actions that we might take that we think, ‘Oh, that’s clearly not natural,’ so we’re 
going to go in there and take significant action” (R16), such as with invasive species.   
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In terms of the way that risky decisions are perceived, some believe that they’re 
perceived positively when successful, and negatively when they’re not. The NPS does ask 
managers to take informed risks, and the higher the level of risk, the higher up the 
hierarchy the decision should go. However, some employees are still concerned that if they 
try something and it doesn’t work out, that they won’t get the next job or opportunity. One 
respondent describes the consequences of failure as “dramatic…the consequences tend to 
be more political than not, and that political translates into financial along the way, and 
then the financial translates into conservation” (R18). Another believes that “in the future 
we’ll have to give managers the license to try things and fail, and we’ll have to reward 
what I’ll call ‘good failure,’ failure that teaches us something” (R23). 
On the other hand, risky decisions that end in failure are okay if you can 
demonstrate that you’ve thought about it, a manager remarked. It’s perceived less 
negatively if managers demonstrate that they’ve made the decision thoughtfully and 
planned mitigation strategies. Others described a “risk-versus-benefit” (R21) way of 
evaluating decisions that includes gathering as much information and creating mitigation 
strategies, especially with regard to the way that they personally deal with problems. 
Another respondent pointed out that the NPS is not a homogenous organization, and that 
some parts of the organization are risk-averse, but there are also risk-takers.   
Overall, there appears to be a recurring pattern of negative consequences in 
response to failure, which further perpetuates an already risk-averse culture. If the NPS 
wishes to adopt the paradigm illustrated in Leopold Revisited, it would need to more 
systematically incentivize targeted risk-taking. In order to be a learning organization, 
adaptive management must be allowed to occur in the true sense of the term, in which it’s 
okay to fail and learn from the consequences.  
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4.2.4 Growing Popularity of Collaboration 
	  
While risk-taking is being disincentivized, collaboration is being promoted, at least 
in the agency rhetoric. According to interview data, collaboration and partnerships appear 
to be growing trends. When asked how success is measured, responses ranged from the 
number of employee and visitor accidents and fatalities, to meeting budget goals, to 
relationships with communities, and employee and visitor satisfaction.  “There’s a lot of 
pressure to ‘get along,’ one respondent noted. “Now we call former adversaries our 
‘partners.’ If the NPS is dealing with a controversial situation, success is gauged by how 
many parties are satisfied” (R9). Also, things that promote visitation and are good for 
visitors seem to be rewarded well. In contrast, superintendents who deal with big resource 
issues probably receive less praise, another interviewee explained.  
One of the goals in Revisiting Leopold is to create transformative experiences for 
visitors (NPS, 2012b). Very few respondents spoke to this concept, and transformative 
experiences was not a deliberate focus of the interview. However, one respondent 
described them as “experiences that both educate and inspire. It’s not enough to simply 
educate visitors without inspiring them, and it’s not sufficient or transformative to inspire 
them but not provide educational content” (R3). This respondent explained that this is 
because visitor experiences within the park are critical for resource stewardship and visitor 
engagement. This goal may serve to increase a particular type of public engagement and 
collaboration. 
From the data, a number of trends emerged within the system, such as declining 
budgets and staff and an increasing “crisis management mode,” an increasingly litigious 
culture, and the rising pressure to “get along.” Common patterns across the system that 
managers continuously raised included budgets that favor visitor services over natural 
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resources, disincentives to risk-taking, and the loss of knowledge and buy-in associated 
with staff turnover. These trends and patterns have emerged as recurring process that limit 
the ability of the NPS to become a learning organization. However, they are driven by the 
structure and culture of the organization, and ultimately, by underlying mental models.   
4.3 What are the Structural Attributes of the System? 
	  
Even more influential than patterns and trends in Senge’s iceberg model are the 
structural attributes of the system. The following section will discuss structural attributes of 
the NPS that emerged from interviews, including the hierarchical and decentralized nature 
of the organization, the siloed nature of the organization, structural issues around 
partnerships and transboundary management, and scientific capacity.  
4.3.1 Hierarchical and Decentralized 
	  
Most respondents characterized the organizational structure as hierarchical, highly 
decentralized, and park-centric. There are seven regions, each with their own regional 
directors with different personalities and priorities, and a diversity of parks within that, of 
different unit types.  These unit types respond to challenges in different ways, depending 
on whether they’re monuments, predominantly cultural parks, or “natural parks.”  
All managers reflected on issues at a variety of scales and the interconnectedness of 
these issues across scales. However, they also described a very “park-centric” structure in 
which parks are relatively isolated from the political scales above it and park 
superintendents have a great deal of autonomy. “I once heard __ say that the Park Service 
is one of the best run ships in the worst-run Navy,” remarked one respondent. “It’s very 
park-centric. The superintendent is pretty close to God on earth. They get to do what they 
want to do within their park, within reason. I don’t see that changing, because parks are so 
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– how can I say it? – paramount in the Park Service, because visitors connect with parks” 
(R23). Some respondents contrasted this to other federal land management agencies that 
have more of a “command and control structure” (R11) and are much more centralized. 
“We’re a bunch of anarchists…it’s relatively easy in the Park Service to simply ignore 
instructions from __, or even from the regional office, because that’s the way we were 
designed. Parks are physically isolated from centers of population” (R11). Interestingly, 
this demonstrates a mentality in which managers really don’t see themselves in a panarchy 
of scaled systems. If superintendents are “pretty close to God on earth,” then a command-
and-control structure does exist, albeit at the park scale rather than the national scale.   
At the same time, the NPS is still a bureaucracy, with policies and directives that 
come from above. One respondent described the structure of the NPS as challenging,  
“because it’s an odd mix of top-down and bottom-up. The administration 
funnels decisions down from the top, but park units can operate very much as 
isolated units, and superintendents have ultimate decision-making power. 
Regions and Washington office staff sometimes are stuck in the middle. This 
makes communication and information sharing very challenging, because the 
people at the bottom don’t feel in control of the decisions they’re making and 
the people on the top have trouble understanding what the need of the field 
are.” (R19) 
Respondents’ descriptions of a decentralized, autonomous organization on one 
hand, and a top-down hierarchy on the other, creates a schizophrenic and conflicting 
picture of the organizational structure. Regardless, some respondents believe that a 
decentralized structure has both positive and negative effects. For example, a decentralized 
structure encourages innovation and creativity in one park that is sometimes copied in 
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others. Good ideas are not always communicated among relatively isolated parks, however. 
The NPS lacks a “technology transfer piece” (R18), as one respondent put it, which could 
serve as an information feedback.   
When rapid change is needed, some respondents believe the lack of command-and 
control structure at the national level inhibits the ability to force change agency-wide. 
While some recognized that although the agency wants to or is trying to deal with 
complexity, there are not “appropriate strategies or policies to deal with that at this point in 
time” (R1). One respondent used the word “schizophrenic” (R7) to describe how the 
agency is responding, meaning that different parks are taking different actions that 
contradict each other in their approach or philosophy. Also, while one park may come up 
with a creative way to tackle climate change at the park level, climate change is still a 
regional or landscape level problem that takes thinking, funding, and expertise beyond 
what a park has in-house. There are no divisions that cut across all disciplines and parks, 
such as a climate change division, to foster agency-wide progress on this issue. Another 
related negative effect of this park-centric structure that emerged from the interviews was 
the tendency of park employees to limit the scope of their thinking to the park in which 
they work.       
4.3.2 Siloed Organization 
	  
In addition to the relative disconnectedness of parks and the tension between the 
Washington office and the field, respondents described a siloed organization of distinct 
directorates and divisions within a hierarchical, militaristic structure that inhibits 
interdisciplinary work. The different divisions within the agency create “turf wars” (R13). 
According to some respondents, this siloed structure creates challenges from both a 
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business culture standpoint and a practical standpoint, because budgets and missions are 
disconnected. “We don’t even have a good Venn diagram of where the overlap is” (R23). 
While most employees mentioned the slow nature of change in a bureaucracy and 
how long it may take a directive to trickle down from the top to the park level, some 
pointed to the siloed structure as a cause. The implementation of new ideas is difficult in a 
siloed structure because employees must “run things up the flagpole” to make sure that 
superiors are on board. Even within the Washington Office, there are several different 
independent, siloed programs, one respondent noted. Adapting to change is like steering a 
large ship; it just takes time. “When you start enacting and implementing changes…it’s 
once again herding cats. They’re all doing their own thing again. Organizationally it could 
be improved, and some of these silos or some people call it stovepipes need to be broken 
down” (R22). 
Also, the siloed structure of the organization can hamstring the ability of the agency 
to meet the goals of Revisiting Leopold. “Most of the financial structures set forth by 
Congress don’t allow for exchange of funds. Once they put it in a pipeline, they expect it to 
be used in that pipeline. So we have some fundamental administrative challenges that are 
beyond the Park Service itself and that speak more to how we as a country address 
conservation across the landscape” (R18). 
4.3.4 Partnerships and Transboundary Management 
	  
While the NPS appears to be somewhat disjointed at the agency scale due to these 
silos or “stovepipes,” all of the land management agencies seem to also be disjointed at the 
landscape scale. It doesn’t make sense for ecosystem scale management to have separate 
federal land management agencies, remarked one respondent. “I guarantee…that we will 
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look back on ourselves in a hundred years and say, ‘I cannot believe we have a Forest 
Service and a Fish and Wildlife refuge and NPS.’ From a strategic standpoint in terms of 
management conversation and lands across the continent, it’s so silly” (R1). The same 
respondent went on to explain that this division creates too many mission and institutional 
barriers to being highly effective in transboundary management. All managers (state and 
federal) in an ecosystem should agree on common vital signs and jointly monitor and report 
on it. If not, “we’re all working from a different sheet of music. In some cases we don’t 
even have sheets of music, we’ve got some song that we remember, but we’re singing 
different songs” (R1). 
In addition to different missions and goals of land management agencies, there are 
also some practical, structural barriers to transboundary collaboration, such as high 
university overheads and law and policy restrictions on spending money outside of park 
boundaries. One respondent pointed out that “when you’re requesting money for a project, 
if you try to do a couple of parks, try to go in together and request a project, one park has to 
be the owner of that project, and that kind of kicks out another project for that park. You 
only have so many projects you can ask for, and when two parks go together, you’ve lost 
one of your projects” (R4). This works as a disincentive to partnering with other parks. 
In fact, there seemed to be very few structural incentives to working outside of park 
boundaries. According to several respondents, the people collaborating at broader scales 
are a select group of motivated, creative individuals that aren’t often rewarded for their 
efforts by their supervisors. One notable exception is the existence of Landscape 
Conservation Cooperatives (LCCs) that serve as landscape-level networks for science and 
management issues at the regional scale.  
Organizational Adaptation in an Era of Complexity, Uncertainty, and Change 
	  
	   70	  
Many employees highlighted the need to reevaluate and update management 
policies to be more in line with the goals of the Revisiting Leopold report and current 
management realities. Comments about the current 2006 Management Policies often 
pertained to the need to incorporate mechanisms to allow the agency to meaningfully 
engage in large-scale conservation, not just for the protection of the individual park, but for 
opportunities to engage in a larger conservation arena.  
4.3.5 Scientific Capacity  
	  
In addition to building partnerships with agencies, another common response to the 
question about how the report might be implemented was that the NPS needs to build 
partnerships with scientists and universities. Many cited the need to build capacity for 
scientists in parks, specifically the need to allocate more time, money and effort towards 
science, monitoring, skill development, information sharing, and increasing scientific 
literacy. Several mentioned that they would like to see more long-term partnerships with 
scientists and universities, but that this is difficult due to policy and contracting constraints. 
Two mentioned the LCCs already in place in many parts of the country. 
When asked how they believe the agency can best deal with complexity and rapid 
change, many respondents cited increased long-term monitoring in order to better 
understand system changes. However, monitoring is expensive, and although partnering 
with universities is a good way to do that, university partnerships are even more expensive. 
Legally and contractually, it’s extremely difficult to spend money outside of park 
boundaries. Most of the appropriations from Congress are single-year appropriations, so 
unless an employee is carefully making sure that there’s money set aside for long-term 
monitoring and tracking it closely, it can fall through the cracks after a couple of years.  
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Several respondents described the loss of agency scientists to the U.S.G.S. years 
ago. As a result, additional scientific capacity is based on scarce additional funding, 
especially in smaller parks. Compared to the other agencies, one respondent believes the 
NPS has fewer social scientists “that work to bring disciplines together. We have planners, 
but not necessarily people in the social sciences conducting scientific methods produced by 
the social sciences” (R13). 
Another interviewee pointed out that while many agency employees have 
backgrounds in mathematics and the “hard sciences” (R17), they move up the career ladder 
into management, planning, or project manager roles in which they’re not using their 
technical knowledge. As a result, the agency may have untapped scientific capacity.   
4.4 What are the Cultural Characteristics of the System? 
	  
	   While not specified as a “layer” on Senge’s iceberg, the cultural characteristics of a 
system are also highly influential on how it operates. Cultural characteristics often appear 
to be interrelated with structural characteristics, but also affected by some of the mental 
models. Thus, cultural characteristics that emerged from interviews are discussed here, and 
include the NPS’s tradition of preservation, cultures surrounding each division, how 
success is rewarded and incentivized, risk-aversion, and perceptions of organizational 
change. 	  
4.4.1 Tradition of Preservation 
	  
Many of the interviewees believe that a cultural shift within the NPS is necessary to 
implement the ideas in the Revisiting Leopold report. Some respondents see the NPS as a 
fairly conservative agency, perhaps more so than other land management agencies that 
some respondents view as more flexible and adaptable. Respondents cite a long tradition of 
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preservation and protection that has somewhat trapped the NPS in a more conservative 
approach. The other agencies are a bit more “loose and less hierarchical. They’re more 
jack-of-all-trades, instead of compartmentalized, like LE, interp[retation], and resources. 
They’re into multiple use, and that presets an organization and the people in it to adapt 
better” (R20), says one respondent. 
4.4.2 Divisional 
	  
      The above respondent’s perception of the NPS as “compartmentalized” was also 
echoed by many other respondents. The organizational structure seems to influence the 
organizational culture, because many employees brought up cultural barriers that stem from 
the siloed structure. For example, some noted that employees don’t work across divisional 
lines well, because directions are set by their division chiefs and supervisors. While 
resource managers may be aware of the types of problems that the report highlights, there 
must be buy-in from all divisions, which would require a major culture shift, explains a 
respondent.   
 Another respondent notes that a lot of the staff has a law enforcement background, 
which comes with a military mentality of controlling crowds and giving out tickets. 
Instead, the NPS needs younger people with more diverse backgrounds. Perhaps this is a 
symptom of another phenomenon described by a different interviewee. “We have the park 
ranger, who used to be the be-all and end-all. That’s slowly morphed into 
specialties…we’ve gone from the generalist to the specialist, and if you’re going to be 
adaptive, it’s hard to get specialists to adapt quickly to anything” (R18).  
4.4.3 Motivation and Success 
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While NPS employees may be highly specialized, many are also fairly self-
motivated. Because they don’t receive bonuses or significant awards, and are often paid 
less than they might be in the private sector, many elect to do their jobs because “it’s the 
right thing to do. You do it because you’re going to make a small step towards leaving this 
place unimpaired for future generations” (R7).  Another respondent explained that, “There 
are people out there, especially superintendents, who are like, ‘You’re just doing your job, 
just do it. Don’t expect a reward.’ That’s part of our culture. It’s rewarding in the fact that 
you’re working in beautiful places and doing cool stuff, but the Park Service itself is more 
like the military” (R20).  
In terms of recognition for good work, several respondents noted that they can only 
give or receive small things such as mugs, t-shirts, or pencils, so employees ultimately must 
be intrinsically motivated. Or, publicly spotlighting good work is perhaps the most 
effective way to reward an employee. Employees generally aren’t going to receive approval 
and accolades proportionate to the amount of investment and work they put in, one 
respondent notes. For example, the respondent described having to turn employees away 
during the government shutdown, because they’re dedicated and wanted to be at work. This 
particular manager expressed frustration that he or she couldn’t reward staff with anything 
more meaningful than pens, pencils, or cups, such as lengthy time-off or monetary awards.   
Another issue related to rewarding success is that employees naturally work to 
achieve goals that are attainable within the timespan that they occupy a particular position. 
One interviewee pointed out that  
“We’re good at giving awards to people for individual actions, something that 
takes place over a relatively short term. We are terrible at acknowledging and 
rewarding long-term leadership. It isn’t even reflected necessarily in who gets 
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promoted, which I’ve never completely understood…I sometimes am 
completely befuddled by who moves up in the organization and who does not. 
Some of the very best seem to move up, and also some of the truly mediocre 
seem to move up.” (R11) 
The people who hold upper management positions or positions in the Washington Office 
are those who have been there for a long time. “The individuals managing the agency are 
generally 30-plus-year employees of the Park Service, …[and] you have basically the older 
crowd managing this agency who are maybe still doing things the way they were done in 
the ‘70’s… You don’t often have a young go-getter who gets placed into a position of 
power or decision-making” (R22). In order to adapt and change more quickly, the agency 
needs a wider diversity of those with power and decision-making ability, this respondent 
believes.  
Another employee critiqued the NPS’ lack of a merit-based promotion system. 
Unless an employee does something that’s perceived as an adverse action of some kind by 
management, there’s not an incentive or motivation to perform well; if someone performs 
really well, his or her job may not change. Employees can be either incredibly productive, 
average, or non-productive, and there isn’t a system where, for example, a high-quality, a 
highly productive researcher is rewarded for productivity and long-term success over the 
course of his or her career.  
4.4.4 Risk-Aversion 
	  
Another cultural trait that is closely related to the motivation and incentive system 
discussed above is a culture of risk-aversion. Managers were asked to assess the degree to 
which they consider themselves risk-takers. A few described themselves as fairly 
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conservative. One respondent put it this way: “According to Meyers-Briggs, I’m not a big 
risk-taker. As it relates to many of these issues and interdisciplinary nontraditional 
approaches, I’m a pretty big risk-taker, a largely creative, out of the box thinker. But I 
compare that to the agency as a whole. If you’re comparing me to Google, it may be a 
totally different deal” (R13)!  
Others fell in the middle of the spectrum, describing themselves as “moderate” 
(R21) or “calculated” (R7; R15; R18), willing to take informed risks with as much 
knowledge as possible. “It’s a good idea to be precautionary, but in a changing climate 
scenario, that could also limit our options and limit our creativity” (R16), said another. 
Some of the self-described risk-takers had some caveats, or reasons why they felt 
able to take risks. One manager qualified his or her response, noting that, “I’m more risky 
than some of my peers, but in more of an entrepreneurial sense, early adopter sense… but 
more in the early adopter phase than the innovation phase… I tend to take more political 
risks than financial risks…calculated (R18)”. Others believed that they were able to be risk 
takers because they are “old enough, secure enough in my career that I can take 
risks…[and] I’m not really on the front lines of making decisions anymore” (R23). Another 
observed, “I’m fairly outspoken. I say what I think…And if I wanted to be a park 
superintendent, that probably would not be a trait that would stand me in very good stead 
(R11)”. Revisiting Leopold promotes the precautionary principle, meaning that managers 
should be “conservative in allowing actions and activities that may heighten impairment of 
park resources and consistent in avoiding actions and activities that may irreversibly impact 
park resources and systems” (NPS, 2012b, p. 15). However, what does it mean to 
“irreversibly impact park resources” in an era of rapid change? Does such a “conservative” 
approach promote learning and adaptation? 
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4.4.5 Perceptions of Organizational Change 
	  
Perhaps with the exception of the precautionary principle, most respondents agreed 
that the majority of the ideas in Revisiting Leopold represent a paradigm shift or an 
ideological change for the NPS. However, when asked about how and where a change like 
this would occur in the NPS, or where the impetus for change comes from, respondents 
gave a wide variety of responses. In fact, almost every interviewee responded differently. 
However, responses can generally be grouped into three categories: those who believe that 
change comes from various levels or groups within the organization, those who believe it 
will come from an outside force, such as a particular catalyst, Congress, or public opinion, 
and those who expressed skepticism about change in the NPS due to organizational 
characteristics.  
Several respondents cited a “combination of scales and perspectives” (R16) as an 
impetus for change, from both the park level (especially superintendents and resource 
mangers) to the White House Council on Environmental Quality and the Director. These 
respondents tended to think that change occurs from both the “top-down and bottom-up” 
(R3). 
Five people specifically referenced Rogers’ diffusion of innovation theory, citing 
early adopters as the change agents in the NPS. When asked who these early adopters are, 
one respondent believed them to be the corps of people who are superintendents, regional 
directors, and those who work in the Washington office. Another suggested the formation 
of a group of “respected peer leaders” (R6). One respondent specifically listed several 
superintendents, a few people in resource management-related positions at parks, and a few 
regional level people that work with the Inventory and Monitoring Program. Another 
termed them “trailblazers” (R10), or those “front-line staff people who are confronting 
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changes that they see right in front of their faces and having to grapple with these questions 
and what they mean on the ground” (R10). 
Another group believes that change will primarily come from outside forces, such 
as from non-governmental organizations, academia, societal values, Congress (more 
specifically, Congress’ ability to bring the public on board), or the general recognition of 
the need to change that arises out of a need, or specifically, a desperate budget situation. 
Two respondents believed that the agency needs an “aha! moment” (R13; R23), or a 
catalyst, “where we take a really different and incorrect perspective and we learn from it, 
almost like the Yellowstone fires and what that meant for fire ecology and forest 
management” (R13). 
Finally, several respondents seemed to be discouraged or skeptical about 
ideological change within the NPS. “Most of the important ideas in ‘Revisiting’ have 
already been discussed by the leadership in the Park Service…we’re already aware of it, 
it’s just very, very difficult to implement” (R11), said one respondent. Another agrees that 
parks know what they need to do, but they don’t have the budgets or the staff to do it. Not 
all believe that change is impossible, but that it will likely take time.  “It’s not like, ‘Let’s 
convene a symposium and we’ll decide this,’” an interviewee remarked.  “This is going to 
be years and years, and it’s going to be really really messy, and it’s going to be really really 
emotional, and it’s going to be really, really hard. It’s going to be hard because it’s going to 
be ambiguous for a relatively long period of time” (R10).  This feeling of skepticism from 
several of the respondents indicates low levels of readiness for change, and that that NPS 
likely does fall within the control/internal focus quadrant of the competing values 
framework, which suggests that organizational change may be a difficult undertaking 
(Jones et al., 2005).  
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4.5 What are the Mental Models Operating Within the System? 
	  
The bottom level of Senge’s iceberg model, and therefore the place with the most 
leverage in terms of organizational change, is that of mental models. While many mental 
models are likely at play in the NPS, several emerged from those interviewed, including 
mental models according to one’s division, around the role of science, the role of the 
organization, and the mission.  
4.5.1 Divisional Lenses 
	  
Underlying the structure and culture of the organization are mental models, or 
deeply held beliefs and assumptions about the system and the world. Demonstrating how 
mental models, culture, and structure influence each other, one respondent explained that 
employees have certain mental models, or lenses, according to the division in which they 
work.  
“There does exist a Cultural Resource directorate, a Natural Resource directorate, 
and a particular discipline or disciplines of the social sciences fall in 
between…Oftentimes within these bureaucracies and with how humans organize 
the world, their lens, their mental model on some of these issues and the sciences 
associated with some of these issues are going to be biased with sciences they have 
studied and are most familiar with. They may not be the sciences that are needed at 
the time.” (R13)  
Employees may also have different paradigms depending on the type of park unit at which 
they work (e.g. recreation area, historic site, or a large “natural” park). This reveals that 
employees hold conflicting mental models about their role in the organization, and their 
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narrow mental models may be preventing them from understanding how to best work with 
other towards the broader goal of the organization. 
4.5.2 Science is the Answer 
	  
When asked how they see the organization coping with change and complexity, 
additional mental models emerged, such as an inability to break out of the positivist science 
and the strict preservationist nature of the old paradigm. In response to this question, 
almost a third of the respondents cited the need for more science, research and information 
sharing. While some believe that the NPS is improving with regard to science and research, 
most believe that the current level of science and communication about science is still 
inadequate. According to some, the organization is both undertrained and underfunded in 
this capacity. One respondent had this to say about the use of science: 
“It feels like there’s an undercurrent of, ‘Well, you put that science out there to 
meet your needs or to prove a point or to skew it in your direction of whatever 
your spin is on it,’ rather than just taking science for fact that happened in the 
past. Science was fact. It was…I’m hoping that Revisiting Leopold will…allow us 
to put some more faith and trust throughout segments of society in what science 
can mean for understanding where we’re headed and put us into some common 
language.” (R8) 
This respondent highlights two ways that science can be used in the NPS, one way 
highlighted advertently and the other inadvertently. In one capacity, science can be a used 
by managers as tool, such as to support a controversial decision. However, many 
respondents also seemed to think that more science will help to reduce some of the 
complexity and uncertainty in the social ecological system, an idea explored in more detail 
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in later chapters. Both of these views reveal underlying mental models about the roles of 
science in the NPS.   
On the other hand, a few respondents explicitly remarked that the NPS needs to 
become more systemic and holistic in its thinking and management. These respondents 
specifically recognized the “nebulous interconnectivities of the system” (R13), and that 
increasing complexity “induces more value-based decision making” (R13) based on our 
culture and mental models. While many employees appear to be rooted in a positivist 
paradigm, a few employees seem to have mental models more in line with a systems 
thinking paradigm.  
A few respondents remarked that sometimes managers don’t understand or accept 
all of the uncertainty in science, that it is a “process and self-correcting” (R1). They often 
take science as providing some sort of answer, perhaps because it’s more convenient. As 
another respondent puts it,  
“When we talk about putting things into a probability space and trying to 
communicate these complex mathematical terms to managers, it’s very 
difficult. That’s a big challenge, because managers even two levels above my 
position get lost in very simple graphics, for example. They need a Power Point 
presentation with a big sign that says, ‘Take this one!’” (R9) 
On the other hand, another respondent sees the relationship between science and 
management as an improving one, especially in terms of awareness of the uncertainties of 
ecological change.  
Alternatively, sometimes there exists “sort of a good old boys’ approach that, 
‘We’ve done this study, we must know the results, we must know how to build a trail or do 
that because that’s how I was taught when I was a seasonal,’ sort of thing. There’s that 
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network. By improving the understanding of how and where it’s appropriate to use science 
and how and where it’s appropriate to not use science is probably an important 
improvement” (R6). 
4.5.3 Preserve the Past 
	  
In addition to mental models about the role of science, NPS employees also seem to 
be holding on to a broader mental model of needing to preserve the past and sometimes 
demonstrating a fear of change. As one respondent remarked, “With the Park Service, 
where we have this long-term trajectory of the past to which we are trying to preserve, to 
contrast with conserve, just the paradigm of change alone can be threatening… Culturally 
we have a lot of traditional roles and responsibilities which may need to be reconfigured 
and retooled” (R18). 
Some employees struggled with complexity because they felt confined by laws and 
rigid policies that make it difficult to deal with complexity. One respondent complained 
about a recurring response among employees: “We can’t. The rules don’t allow us to do 
that” (R8). The NPS is mentally thinking about the world as it used to be, the same 
respondent remarked, and unable to anticipate what is likely to come our way and plan 
accordingly. The problem is with the Organic Act, another interviewee believes, which 
directs the Service to “preserve and protect…You can’t preserve or protect something 
that’s changing right under your feet” (R20). Another law that is incompatible with rapid 
change is the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). “It can take a decade or longer 
to make a decision through NEPA. That doesn’t speak to adaptation, at least in a short-term 
sense” (R18), one respondent observes. Together, these laws appear to cultivate mental 
models of resistance to change.  
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One respondent believes that the problem or barrier to change is the perceived lack 
of need for new policy. The Management Policies 2006 are very hands-off, and reflect a 
goal of putting “pieces of systems back into place that had previously been disturbed by 
humans and then tries to have as much of a hands-off approach…and tries to provide this 
really wonderful, unimpacted visitation experience for visitors” (R1).  
For many employees, the greatest cultural challenge will be moving away from the 
mentality of preserving the past, and thinking at scales bigger than the individual park. 
Some employees believe this isn’t a conversation the NPS has tackled yet: “we either have 
to be willing to invest to preserve or maintain what we currently have, or have some serious 
discussions about what happens when an entire environment changes… [and we cross] 
difficult thresholds” (R8). 
However, some of this may be driven by the public and how the public views the 
role of parks. “We can have all the best biophysical science in the world on you name the 
topic, but public opinion and acceptance of what we want to do in every case ultimately 
affects the success or failure of what we do” (R1). This sentiment was echoed by many 
managers. People must see the direct connection between themselves and the resources, a 
respondent explained. Effective management is more difficult, for example, when people 
“look out their window and see these beautiful mountains, and once a year they do a picnic 
in __, but other things in life are important to them. We don’t have a connection to them” 
(R1).  
4.5.4 The NPS Mission 
	  
As described above, the way that the public views the role of the NPS is important. 
However, the way that the employees themselves view the role of the organization is also 
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important, especially in creating a strong shared vision. The NPS is a mission-driven 
organization, and most interviewees are supportive of and identify with the agency’s 
mission. Of those interviewed, the overwhelming majority do not see incompatibilities 
between the mission, to “leave [resources] unimpaired for future generations,” and what the 
Revisiting Leopold report is recommending. “Our mission is thoughtfully crafted… I do not 
think that our mission is static. It never has been” (R17), says one respondent. In order to 
preserve resources for future generations, we have to adapt to rapidly changing conditions, 
says another.  
While the majority of those interviewed like and support the mission, some of these 
respondents believe that the interpretation of it, the policies surrounding it, or the way that 
management responds to it need to change. One respondent questioned whether this is 
possible within the bureaucratic system. While some of the underlying assumptions around 
preservation may have been incorrect at the time of the enabling legislation, another 
respondent concedes, we now have a better understanding about inevitable change over 
time. For some, the mission itself isn’t problematic, “it’s just a matter of opening the lens 
wider” (R5) or coming “to a different understanding of ‘impaired’ and ‘unimpaired” (R12). 
Only two respondents doubted the compatibility of the NPS mission with the ideas 
outlined in the report, and two others believed that there was a philosophical disconnect. 
The mission encourages the NPS to hold things in stasis, and “we’ll have to get over the 
fact that we have interpreted our mission to be holding resources at bay from modern 
man…The mission itself is now flawed, but how we interpret the mission might be 
untenable given the changes we’re seeing. New interpretations of the mission will be 
necessary” (R23), says one respondent.  
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When asked if the Park Service mission facilitates managing for change, one 
respondent replied, “Currently I don’t think it does…we do need a little bit of a fine-tuning 
of our mission to emphasize that adaptability in how we manage lands in managing for 
change in the future” (R15). 
The mission of an organization is often highly influential in determining values and 
behaviors of those within it, especially if there is buy-in from employees at a variety of 
levels (Raelin, 2006). It appears that for the sample of managers interviewed, the majority 
of respondents fundamentally supported and believed in the mission of the NPS, and did 
not consider the mandate to preserve resources “unimpaired” to be problematic.  This is 
somewhat surprising due to the fact that managers also supported the idea of managing for 
change and uncertainty. These managers, however, appear to be exercising their ability to 
determine the best way to accomplish their agency’s mission (Osborne, 1993, p. 353), a 
characteristic of a more adaptive organization (Osborne, 1993). It is also possible that in 
their role as early adopters and respected employees within the NPS, these respondents 
may also serve as “meaning-makers” (Raelin, 2006). If so, then their ability to interpret 
“unimpaired” in a broader sense and reconcile the mission with Revisiting Leopold may be 
beneficial for the broader adoption of the ideas within the report. Alternatively, it is 
possible that this sample of the NPS population has not yet fully embraced what it will 
mean to manage for change and uncertainty.  
Given the above responses that illuminate much about the NPS as a system, it 
becomes apparent that there are a variety of barriers to implementing Revisiting Leopold, 
and the NPS employees interviewed do not yet have a shared vision of the new paradigm. 
While a few managers are demonstrating an understanding of systems thinking, many 
problematic attributes exist at the event, pattern, structure, and mental model levels. These 
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attributes are often quite interrelated; the following chapter will explore some of the 
relationships between them.  
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Chapter 5: Analysis 
	  
5.1 Relationships Within the System 
	  
Senge’s iceberg model is a useful tool for demonstrating structures that operate at a 
variety of different levels within a system. It is tempting to interpret problems and events as 
they appear on the surface, yet more difficult to understand and address the underlying 
processes, trends, structures, and mental models that also contribute to the way the system 
operates. While this is a useful framework for interpreting and presenting data, in reality, 
many of the properties of the system that emerged from interviews manifest at multiple 
levels of the iceberg. Additionally, the various levels of the iceberg are interconnected, and 
often influence each other. Events and patterns are usually influenced by structural and 
cultural aspects of the system, and these are usually driven by underlying mental models. 
Structural attributes may influence cultural attributes of the system, and vice-versa. For 
example, mental models about one’s role in the organization according to one’s division 
influence the respective cultures associated with each division. These cultures both 
influence and are influenced by the siloed structure of the organization, which in turn 
affects patterns and events such as competition between divisions for funding in the face of 
declining budgets. This section will explore some of the relationships and 
interconnectivities among properties of the NPS system that emerged from the data, and 
how they affect the ability of the NPS to become a learning organization. Again, the 
following discussion is derived from the views of a sample of managers, and cannot 
necessarily be generalized to the organization as a whole. 
5.1.1 Management Cycles and Short-term Management  
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 One of the properties of systems thinking is the ability to think and manage at 
broader temporal scales and to understand that actions may have consequences that 
manifest much farther into the future than anticipated or than managers have the capacity to 
perceive. This type of long-term thinking is critical to becoming a learning organization, 
yet several structural attributes of the NPS that emerged from this sample are contributing 
to a culture of short-term thinking. For example, employees often only occupy a position 
for a few years before changing positions and/or parks in order to advance up the career 
ladder, or they may vacate a position if their supervisor deems that they are performing 
poorly. As respondent 13 explains it, “…in some cases getting a promotion just means 
you’ve been moved out of your current role so something could actually happen in your 
current role. And in others, it actually means that someone is actually taking on a larger 
role because they’ve been proven competent…” (R13). Because employees often occupy a 
position for a limited period of time, success is also measured within that timeframe.  A 
“management cycle application, is the way that success is measured,” reports respondent 6. 
“If the work you’re doing can be applied for something of interest on a reasonable 
management cycle, it’s respected and applied” (R6). It’s understandable that an employee 
would strive to demonstrate success within the time-period that they hold a position, but 
this creates an incentive to work towards shorter-term goals rather than thinking at broader 
temporal scales. “We’re good at giving awards to people for individual actions, something 
that takes place over a relatively short term. We’re terrible at acknowledging and rewarding 
long-term leadership” (R11). Part of the reason for this may simply be the nature of the 
people who work for the NPS. 
“Most of the people I know who work for the Park Service, they’re can-do people, 
they like to be able to achieve, they like to be able to have some sort of visible 
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success. And generally speaking, people have a very, very short time horizon 
relative to an ecological time horizon. There is this human tendency to want to do 
something that shows results in six months, twelve months, three years. People are 
considered to be long-range thinkers when they’re thinking out five years.” (R10) 
To the extent that this is the case, then it is likely a combination of cultural and structural 
attributes of the organization that contribute to the myopic nature of the NPS. 
A culture of rewarding short-term successes may also be driven by funding cycles. 
“Most of our appropriations are single-year appropriations,” explains one respondent. “So 
unless somebody’s really watching very carefully that there is money set aside for 
monitoring, and sometimes the monitoring may be once every year or it might be once 
every five years or twice every six or seven years…Without somebody tracking that 
closely, that work can often fall through the cracks after a couple of years” (R21). As this 
example demonstrates, structural attributes of an organization are often driving the cultural 
manifestations. In this case, the nature of management cycles, position timelines, and 
funding cycles contribute to a culture of incentivizing and rewarding short-term successes 
and short-term management. In order for the NPS to become a learning organization, it 
may need to alter some of its institutional structures to incentivize long-term thinking and 
management that are more in line with ecosystem scale changes rather than management 
scale changes.  
5.1.2 Disincentives and Risk-Aversion 
	  
In the above example, an NPS culture that prioritizes short-term goals can be a 
product of how success is evaluated and rewarded institutionally. Similarly, success also 
plays a role in the culture of risk-aversion that emerged from interviews. However, there 
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are interrelated factors at all levels of the iceberg that likely contribute to a culture of risk-
aversion. Interviews revealed that there is a pattern of negative consequences in response to 
failure. When asked how the NPS deals with risk and uncertainty in social ecological 
systems, one respondent remarked, “Oh, we reward it when it’s successful, and we usually 
punish it when it’s not successful” (R7). While it appears from interview data that this 
pattern occurs intermittently, when a manager publicly takes a risk and isn’t successful, 
respondents report “dramatic” (R18) consequences, “raking over the coals” (R9), and an 
“incentive system…set up around ‘Don’t make mistakes’” (R10). “We see the failure and 
we forget the lessons from it…Nobody wants to fail” (R23), says another respondent. From 
interview data, it appears success for managers is dependent on not taking risks publicly. 
This creates a culture of risk-aversion that makes learning as an organization difficult.  
Some of this culture of risk-aversion may also be driven by underlying mental 
models about preservation and leaving resources unimpaired. The Revisiting Leopold report 
reinforces the importance of the precautionary principle. One employee explains the 
preservationist culture as stemming from the mission, which is “basically put the pieces 
back and use a hands-off approach to allow ecosystem processes to occur” (R1). “We’re a 
very conservative organization” (R11), says another.  
Some employees may also be influenced by their mental models regarding the level 
of control they have over the system. “I think we have a perception of much more 
management control over an environment or of people than we really have. I think there’s a 
whole lot of ego wrapped up in the term ‘park management’” (R6). Within this sample of 
respondents, it appears that both the negative consequences in the face of public “failure,” 
as well as the underlying mental models about preservation and the need to control and 
“manage” the environment contribute to a culture of risk-aversion.  
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5.1.3 Siloed Structure and Narrow Job Roles 
	  
 Another example of how various levels of the iceberg model are interconnected 
relates to the siloed structure of the NPS, and how this leads to cultural barriers, 
problematic mental models, and ultimately may prevent the implementation of the ideas in 
Revisiting Leopold. The NPS is divided into multiple divisions and directorates that often 
compete for funding. While on the surface it may be obvious that interdivisional 
communication is beneficial to learning and efficiency, the organizational structure makes 
this difficult. There is “a lot of communication that emphasizes interdisciplinary work but 
when the rubber meets the road, it becomes very hierarchical, very militaristic in its 
structure, where certain directorates, certain divisions, certain organizations end up having 
turf wars in moving forward. That really inhibits interdisciplinary work” (R13). The siloed 
structure contributes to a culture in which interdisciplinary work is difficult and divisions 
are sometimes in competition with each other rather than working together towards the 
broader mission.  
Even deeper than this culture, however, are the underlying mental models about 
each employee’s role in the organization and how they define their own job. “The park 
ranger…used to be the be-all and end-all,” remarks one respondent. “We’ve gone from 
generalist to specialist…and it’s hard to get specialists to adapt to anything” (R18). This is 
likely because specialists see their job as very narrow. For example, one interviewee is a 
scientist, and when asked about resiliency, responded, “Well, I don’t think you can look at 
it as a resilient national park. You’d look at it as an attempt to create resilience in primarily 
the dominant plant communities on the landscape” (R20).  While this respondent 
understands the concept of resiliency, he or she only sees its application to his or her 
particular field of expertise. Different divisions, or silos, have their own goals; employees 
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within these divisions often have specific backgrounds suited to their division which may 
influence the way they interpret the environment and approach particular problems. 
“There does exist a Cultural Resource directorate, a Natural Resource 
directorate, and a particular discipline or disciplines of the social 
sciences…Oftentimes within these bureaucracies and with how humans 
organize the world, their lens, their mental model on some of these issues 
and the sciences associated with some of these issues are going to be biased 
with sciences they have studied and are most familiar with. They may not 
be the sciences that are needed at the time.” (R13)  
If employees in different divisions have different “lens,” or ways of seeing the world, then 
the problem is deeper than the organizational structure. It’s unclear whether these 
underlying mental models influence the creation of these silos, whether the siloed structure 
informs these mental models, or both, but there is clearly a relationship between these two 
levels of the iceberg.  
Senge uses the analogy of three blind men touching different parts of an elephant to 
describe the importance of looking at an organization systemically. All three men possess 
real facts about part of the elephant, “but they will never know an elephant” (Senge, 2006, 
p.66) as a whole. “To understand the most challenging managerial issues requires seeing 
the whole system that generates the issues” (Senge, 2006, p. 66). These underlying mental 
models, culture, and structure may ultimately affect the ability of the NPS to adopt the 
ideas in Revisiting Leopold. To create a shared vision, all employees must understand and 
buy into the concepts of the new paradigm, not just those in resource management. With 
regard to the report itself, on interviewee wondered, “How many chiefs of maintenance and 
maintenance supervisors have been educated about this? And visitor protection staff, too, 
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how many chief rangers and district rangers and whatnot” (R12). That question is difficult 
to answer and beyond the scope of this study, but breaking down silos and narrow mental 
models within the NPS will likely be important for creating a shared vision around the 
implementation of this report and for the creation of a learning organization.  
5.1.4 Transboundary Management: Rhetoric and Agency Culture 
	  
Another component of systems thinking is an ability to think at broader scales, or to 
see oneself within a panarchy of nested hierarchies (Walker & Salt, 2006). To become a 
learning organization, managers must understand the systems operating at both larger and 
smaller scales. Revisiting Leopold calls for NPS employees to understand that parks are 
“embedded in larger regional and continental landscapes influenced by adjacent land and 
water uses and regional cultures” (NPS, 2012).  
The managers interviewed for this study all generally understood the need to 
collaborate at broader scales. “It’s pretty clear we can’t do our job without working 
together” (R12), remarked one respondent. Additionally, the concept of collaboration with 
stakeholders seems to be increasing in popularity. “There’s a lot of pressure to ‘get along,’ 
one respondent noted. “Now we call former adversaries our ‘partners.’ If the NPS is 
dealing with a controversial situation, success is gauged by how many parties are satisfied” 
(R9). However, if the NPS wants employees to collaborate at broader scales and employ 
more transboundary management at the landscape scale, it cannot accomplish this simply at 
the event level of the iceberg. “There’s a lot of personal incentive in [collaborating at 
broader scales]… everybody says, ‘partner, partner, partner,’ but all of the internal systems 
in the Park Service make that difficult” (R1).  
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Although there are cultural and mental model barriers to working at broader scales, 
interviews indicate that the most significant barriers are structural. Land management 
agencies have different missions and legal jurisdictions. “Sometimes those are federal 
jurisdictional boundaries between one agency and another, but it goes way beyond that. 
Obviously you’re looking at landscapes that are a mosaic of different kinds of government 
engagement and private sector. It becomes complicated fast” (R5). Funding mechanisms 
and associated rules about how that money can be spent further complicates transboundary 
management. “Working outside of parks, our ability to get money, much less use it for 
conservation efforts that are larger-scale than any one park doesn’t exist. Right now we 
chase project funds or park-based dollars…There’s a couple real small conservation pots, 
but in general…within our current funding rubric, that doesn’t exist” (R8), one respondent 
explains.  
Culturally, the NPS seems to still be schizophrenic with regard to incentivizing 
working at broader scales. Managers hear a lot of rhetoric about the importance of 
transboundary management and collaborating at broader scales (e.g. “everybody says, 
‘partner, partner, partner” (R1)), but many other respondents remarked that the only 
incentive to doing so was personal. “The people who do that… it’s almost like, they don’t 
necessarily get punished, but they just don’t get any credit for it, really” (R23). 
Several other respondents spoke to the contradiction between the current culture 
and the need to work at broader scales. “The culture says, ‘Stay in your park. Work in your 
park, don’t stick your neck out. You’re getting paid to protect the resources in __ [park 
unit], and you shouldn’t be lollygagging or running around with a bunch of other people in 
a partnership,’ even though it helps the park” (R20). In “Revisiting Leopold,” remarks 
another respondent, “the committee is instructing the Park Service to get outside the 
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boundaries of its parks to work with other landscape managing agencies and think big 
picture…but I can tell you that that’s not how we’re used to working, ‘we’ the Park Service 
and ‘we’ most other agencies” (R11). Another interviewee considers there to be a level of 
“cultural arrogance in the national park system” (R16) with regard to working with other 
agencies. 
Another barrier, believes one respondent, is that both agencies and communities 
need to have a reason to collaborate. They must “see something in it for themselves…in 
some cases it could be more water, and in other cases for a local community it could be 
flood protection. It could be tourism opportunities and economic development” (R1). 
Otherwise, if the agencies or the public don’t see any “tangible benefits” (R1), then 
cooperation can be difficult. This speaks to underlying mental models on both the part of 
park managers, and the public. It appears that some managers in the NPS don’t yet fully 
believe in the intrinsic value of working outside their boundaries, and it highlights the 
differing mental models that the public holds with regard to the role of parks in their 
communities.  
Additionally, the decentralized structure of parks may have contributed to a 
tendency of some NPS employees to be inward looking and hold park-centric mental 
models of their role in conservation. “Historically the agency has been managing each park 
as somewhat of an island, not worrying as much about beyond the boundaries” (R22). On 
the mental model level, however, this may be changing. “The role of the superintendent 
each year is becoming more and more focused on reaching out to those neighboring 
communities, neighboring agencies, and other partners…Unfortunately, right now at this 
point, it’s mainly just that, talking about it” (R22). Without cultural support for 
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partnerships and transboundary management, as well as the structures in place to allow it, 
landscape scale conservation will continue to be an elusive goal. 
5.1.5 Budgets, Spending, and Public Support 
	  
Almost all respondents reported budgets and staff cuts as a barrier to implementing 
the ideas in Revisiting Leopold. As a result, respondents report that this puts managers in a 
reactive mode, where they are “responding to the crisis of the day” at the expense of “some 
of the resource programs that are really important” (R4). However, there may be other 
reasons that some programs are not receiving funding in accordance with the extent to 
which managers deem them important. For example, several respondents reported that it’s 
difficult to acquire money for projects that aren’t “sexy” (R1; R20) or high profile. One 
manager remarks:  
“We get a huge amount or reward for the success of the __ restoration program 
because of its visibility. We also have a really, really good aquatic invasive 
species program right now that I believe has been responsible for prevention of a 
lot of bad things that could have come to this park, but because it’s not a sexy 
project…people don’t take notice to it. A lot of money doesn’t flow towards it.” 
(R1) 
This may be driven by a cultural tendency of the NPS, or by the public’s mental models 
about what is important to preserve. A superintendent notes that “…the visitors write 
letters, and of course resources can’t, but that’s what gets the attention, trying to make 
people happy, trying to soothe ruffled feathers, rather than look at…what we did to try to 
protect the park” (R4). Regardless, public opinion seems to impact how resources are 
managed. 
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The NPS’ funding structure also plays a role in how funding is allocated for 
projects. In terms of a superintendent’s baseline budget, “75% of your budget goes to 
visitor services…and only 25% of your budget goes to resources. And that’s generous. 
That’s a [large] park. In most parks, it’s probably less than that” (R23).  
According to Jones et al.’s concept of readiness for change, employees who believe 
their organization has flexible polices and procedures are more likely to perceive change 
positively (Jones et al., 2005). With regard to fiscal policy, flexible budget and spending 
rules are an important component of transition to a more flexible, adaptable culture in 
government agencies (Sanger, 2008).  Whether it’s due to structural budget constraints or 
the forces of public opinion, managers consider their hands tied with regard to how they 
can allocate fiscal resources. This seems to be hampering their ability to institute long-term 
monitoring programs and increase scientific capacity. Further, this may make it more 
difficult to manage resources that are key to maintaining resiliency, for example, or to 
implement some of the other ideas in the Revisiting Leopold report.  
Another factor that is revealing with regard to visitor support is the concept of 
transformative experiences. While not many respondents addressed this particular goal, one 
respondent noted that transformative experiences involve both education and inspiration; it 
is “absolutely crucial for resource stewardship [for] visitors to be engaged” (R3). Whether 
the respondent was implying that inspired visitors improve resource stewardship in the 
financial and political sense, in the behavioral sense, or both, it reinforces the degree of 
importance that the NPS places on public opinion.  
Several mental models may be underlying this system. It is apparent that NPS 
employees believe that public support, either politically, financially, or more personally, is 
necessary to continue to function as an organization and to maintain relevance. This 
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assumption may be true, but regardless, it is influencing spending practices, possibly at the 
expense of critical resource projects. The public also possesses mental models about how 
the NPS should spend its money, whether it is on visitor services such as picnic tables and 
restrooms, or on “sexy,” “visible,” resources. In order to give managers the flexibility they 
need to implement Revisiting Leopold and become a learning organization, it may be 
beneficial to consider these underlying assumptions.  
5.2 Learning Disabilities 
 
Other types of barriers to adopting the ideas in the Revisiting Leopold report, 
closely related to mental models, are what Peter Senge terms “learning disabilities” (Senge, 
2006). Identifying learning disabilities is important because if the NPS wishes to transform 
itself in the way that Revisiting Leopold describes, then it must identify the processes that 
are preventing it from becoming more adaptive and working more systemically.   
Many organizations learn poorly, regardless of whether they are in the private or 
public sector, large or small. What these organizations have in common, however, are 
similar reasons that they learn poorly, or learning disabilities. “The way they are designed 
and managed, the way people’s jobs are defined, and, most importantly, the way we have 
all been taught to think and interact (not only in organizations but more broadly) create 
fundamental learning disabilities” (Senge, 2006, p. 18). When learning disabilities are at 
play, even intelligent, motivated employees have trouble solving organizational problems, 
and “often the harder they try to solve problems, the worse the results” (p. 18). In other 
words, simply trying hard to implement the ideas in Revisiting Leopold may not be enough 
to transition into a new paradigm if learning disabilities are occurring.  
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5.2.1 “I Am My Position” 
 
Many employees, especially government employees, are taught to be dedicated to 
their jobs, sometimes to the extent that employees confound them with their own identities 
(Senge, 2006). This is especially true in the NPS, an organization in which employees are 
highly intrinsically motivated. This manifests itself in mental models such as “I am a Park 
Ranger.” When asked about their occupation, most people explain the duties they carry out 
rather than the mission of the organization to which they belong. They may view their 
position as part of a larger system over which they have little control, so they execute their 
position while trying to deal with the attributes of the organization over which they have no 
influence. For example, in the NPS, employees might think of this as simply coping with 
“the red tape” or the “bureaucracy.” As a result, employees often view their duties as 
constrained by the scope of their job title, and when they concentrate on only their job, 
employees feel very little responsibility for the circumstances created when all positions 
intersect. When this combined circumstance is less than ideal, it may be difficult to see 
why, so people automatically assume that “someone screwed up” (Senge, 2006, p. 19).  
Perhaps because of the siloed nature of the organization, many NPS employees 
demonstrate this “I am my position” learning disability. This is tied to different underlying 
mental models about the purpose of one’s job depending on which division one works 
within. As described in the section above, “The park ranger…used to be the be-all and end-
all…We’ve gone from generalist to specialist…and it’s hard to get specialists to adapt to 
anything” (R18). This is likely because specialists see their job as very narrow, just as the 
scientist mentioned in the previous section understood the concept of resiliency but was 
only able to apply it in terms of plant communities. Different divisions, or silos, have their 
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own goals and employees within these divisions often have different backgrounds that 
influence the ways they view and approach the world.  
Not only do employees have narrow lenses through which they see their position, 
but all employees did in fact describe their job purely in terms of the boundaries of their 
positions. For example, “I work on a lot of planning products for various parks” (R22), “I 
do the T&E species, wildlife, lead, sound, geology…research permitting” (R20), or “I serve 
as the point of contact for all the __ coordinators for the __ parks” (R2), were 
representative types of responses when employees were asked to describe their job. None 
mentioned the broader purpose of the NPS. While this is a natural response to the question 
asked, it reveals a tendency for employees to identify more with their position than with the 
larger mission of the NPS. This perpetuates an assumption that as long as an employee 
executes the duties of their position, then the organization will function as it should. 
However, to become a learning organization, managers must be able to step back and 
examine what happens to the NPS system when positions interact on an organizational 
scale.  
While remedying the “I am my position” learning disability will help the NPS 
become a better learning organization, a strong identification with one’s position may be an 
attribute with which the NPS can work if it wants to change the current system. For 
example, if the NPS wants to implement the ideas in Revisiting Leopold, then it may be 
able to incorporate some of the ideas in the report into employee’s management 
descriptions in the short-term. In the long-term, it would be beneficial to work on changing 
mental models about the scope of each employee’s position.  
5.2.2 “The Enemy is Out There” 
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Another learning disability, which is actually a derivative of “I am my position,” is 
“the enemy is out there,” meaning a tendency to look outside oneself when there is a 
problem. When people focus solely on their own job, they fail to see how their actions 
affect circumstances beyond their position, and when problems arise, people “misperceive 
these new problems as externally caused” (Senge, 2006, p. 20).  
For example, almost all respondents cited a variety of structural and cultural 
barriers within the organization to implementing the ideas in Revisiting Leopold, but very 
few spoke about how they themselves could work to implement some of the ideas in the 
report. While most employees recognized that the new paradigm described in Revisiting 
Leopold represents a needed change for the organization, many deferred to others in the 
NPS and seemed to be employing a “wait and see approach” when asked about how the 
report would be implemented. Six respondents cited the implementation team and several 
others “don’t know” how the report will be implemented or believed it was up to others, 
either more broadly in the NPS, their superiors, or “champions” within the organization. “A 
lot’s going to depend on [my supervisor]” (R12), remarked an interviewee.  
Respondents also blamed factors outside the organization for the inability to shift 
into a new paradigm. “From where I sit, Congress is the most likely source of our challenge 
right now. The reason I say that is because you have such divergent philosophies within 
that organization, and ultimately that entity becomes representative of the public as a 
whole” (R8). In response to a question about challenges to implementing the report, a 
respondent hopes for “a more reasonable climate in Congress” (R5), and another spoke to 
the need for “some authority from Congress” (R21) to deal with these issues. Beyond 
Congress, “public opinion and acceptance of what we want to do in every case ultimately 
affects the success or failure of what we want to do” (R1). While these respondents may 
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not be wrong, very little, if any, introspection about the respondents themselves emerged 
from interviews. For managers to truly begin to think systemically, they must be able to see 
their own role in the system.   
5.2.3 “The Illusion of Taking Charge” 
 
Being “proactive” is a popular endeavor. Many managers “proclaim the need for 
taking charge in facing difficult problems. What is typically meant by this is that we should 
face up to difficult issues, stop waiting for someone else to do something, and solve 
problems before they grow into crises” (Senge, 2006, p. 20). Unfortunately, being proactive 
often means aggressively fighting the “enemy out there,” which will not solve problems 
unless managers understand how they themselves are part of the problem. “True 
proactiveness comes from seeing how we contribute to our own problems” (Senge, 2006, p. 
21).  
In order to implement the recommendations in Revisiting Leopold, the authors 
suggest a systematic review of agency policies, yet also advise against altering the 
founding legislation of the NPS. They convey the need for urgent “structural changes and 
long-term investments” (NPS, 2012b, p. 23). While the recommendations of the 
Implementation Team have not been released at the time of this writing, it would also 
behoove the NPS to examine the underlying systemic processes of the system before 
employing an “urgent” (NPS, 2012b, p.23) proactive approach.   
5.2.4 Fixation on Events 
	  
A common tendency within organizations is to fixate on events that have caused 
current problems, which leads to “event level” solutions. Senge notes that this is an 
evolutionary human tendency, because for much of early human history, the principle 
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threats to survival were from rapid events, rather than from slower gradual processes (e.g. 
an arms race or environmental degradation) (Senge, 2006). However, by not seeing the 
longer-term, slower variables that are contributing to problems, organizations will be 
unable to solve them.  
While some respondents were able to think more systemically about the report, 
“fixation on events” was evident in many interviews. For example, some managers 
reported that they were struggling to implement ideas in the report because they were busy 
doing budget exercises, reacting to the crisis of the day, or lacked specific guidance about 
how to implement the report. However, a few recognized longer-term patterns of change 
and the need to think at that scale. One superintendent described the loss of infrastructure 
from significant storm events, and noted that, “We’re dealing with it on a case-by-case 
basis, but in total, if you look across the landscape, it really has potential for a very 
cumulative effect, a dramatic impact on natural resources, cultural resources, and societal 
support for parks…” (R10). Some managers are thinking about the longer-term impacts, 
but according to this respondent, some employees still seem to be reacting to the loss of 
infrastructure at the event level.  
Like the example above, some employees seem to be trying to think in terms of 
long-term variables, but are stymied by other factors that cast issues in terms of short-term 
events. With regard to climate change, says the same superintendent, “[interpreters] clearly 
see that they want to be able to talk about climate change, to talk about what the impacts 
are and what people can do, but they’re also grappling with the unfortunate political 
situation where climate change is seen as an issue as opposed to fact based” (R10). If 
interpreters are still dealing with the short-term or event level debate over whether climate-
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change is fact based, then they are inhibited from being able to engage in deeper 
discussions about such as how to address it into the future.  
A fixation on short-term events is also evident in the way that success is evaluated 
and rewarded. “If you don’t design a goal around a three-to-five-year horizon, its relevancy 
to park and regional management is pretty low, and really to most people involved, the 
relevancy of any project that takes more than two or three or four years to have a result is 
pretty low. I’m not sure that’ll ever change, or that there’s a reason or need to change it” 
(R6). This issue relates to other cultural and structural barriers that prevent thinking at 
larger temporal scales, but this quote also highlights the tendency of supervisors to evaluate 
short-term events that their employees accomplish rather than examining how those goals 
or projects are contributing to longer-term variables.   
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Chapter 6: System Archetypes 
	  
 For organizational purposes, much of this thesis has presented findings in discrete 
sections. Systems thinking, however, is a method for examining the whole. It is about 
examining interrelationships and patterns instead of individual pieces, as well as a tool to 
understand positive and negative feedback loops. This chapter draws upon Senge’s concept 
of archetypes (Senge, 2006) to examine circles of causality that emerged from the data, 
rather than simply linear relationships.  
Feedback loops occur when actions either reinforce or counteract each other. In an 
era of complexity, feedback loops create simplicity by revealing deeper patterns that 
operate below surface-level events. There are two types of feedback loops: reinforcing, or 
positive feedbacks, and balancing, or negative feedbacks. When a reinforcing loop is 
occurring, managers may fail to see how small actions create large consequences, and when 
a balancing feedback loop is occurring, managers may not understand why they cannot 
break out of the status quo, despite their best efforts. Feedbacks can manifest in a 
potentially infinite number of ways, but there are several general patterns or structures that 
recur over and over again across all field and types of organizations. Senge terms these 
archetypes, and has identified 10 archetypes that repeatedly manifest in a variety of 
different organizations. Once identified, they highlight places where managers have 
leverage to change the situation (Senge, 2006). This section will explore a few of the many 
archetypes that describe the relationships as depicted by the respondents.    
6.1 Limits to Growth 
 
In the limits to growth archetype, one reinforcing feedback loop is experiencing a 
period of accelerated growth. This growth is slowed, however, by a balancing feedback that 
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limits the extent to which the reinforcing loop can grow. A common warning symptom that 
this type of archetype is occurring is when managers notice that even though they’re trying 
hard to promote something, the organization seems to stay in the same place (Senge, 2006).  
 This archetype emerged from the data when respondents spoke about transboundary 
management and their attempts to collaborate at broader scales, as Revisiting Leopold 
recommends. Respondents all understood that parks exist as political “islands,” as well as 
the need for and the benefit of collaborating with partners and managing at the ecosystem 
scale. The rhetoric of partnership and collaboration outside of park boundaries has been 
increasing, which serves as the growing action. However, many respondents also described 
fiscal, legal, contractual, and ideological barriers to doing this in practice. Thus, the 
“growth” of transboundary management is limited by structural and cultural constraints. 
The figure below shows the general model of the archetype, with its manifestation in the 
NPS below it.  
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Figure	  3:	  Limits	  To	  Growth	  
In order to break the counterbalancing cycle of limits to growth, managers should avoid 
trying to force the growth process; it will only stall until the limitations are removed. In this 
case, further advocating the “partner, partner, partner” (R1) rhetoric will be fruitless until 
the practical limits to doing so are loosened.  
6.2 Fixes That Fail 
	  
When managers run into problems, they often employ the easiest, most immediate 
solution, or the solution that has seemed to work in the past. The fixes that fail archetype 
occurs when a solution is effective in the short term but has unintended longer-term 
outcomes which may necessitate more of the same fix. A red flag that may indicate that this 
archetype is occurring is when managers notice that, “it always seemed to work before; 
why isn’t it working now” (Senge, 2006, p. 399)? 
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When interviewees were asked about how to deal with complexity, uncertainty, and 
rapid change, many cited the need for more science and information. While this may 
provide a short-term solution in the context of an Environmental Impact Statement, 
litigation, or a particular resource issue, this is not a long-term fix to the fundamental 
problem. Over time, more science will simply generate more questions and uncertainty, and 
likely reveal more complexity.  
	  
Figure	  4:	  Fixes	  that	  Fail	  
To solve difficult, complex problems, managers need to concentrate on the long-
term rather than the short-term. Short-term fixes should only be used to “buy time” while 
dealing with the underlying solution. The above archetype demonstrates that many NPS 
employees, and even upper-level managers, are still stuck in a positivist scientific 
paradigm. Positivist science is necessary and appropriate in many situations. However, in 
the face of emergent complexity and wicked problems, or problems that don’t have a single 
obvious solution, only responses with varying degrees of practicality (Brunson, 2012),  
managers are struggling to break out of their mental models, and are instead relying on 
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“more of the same” to solve problems for which positivist science isn’t appropriate. More 
science is not a bad thing, and in fact, more science will likely be needed to understand 
systemic relationships into the future. However, this calls for a different type of science, 
such as Funtowicz and Ravetz’s postnormal science (1993). 
6.3 Eroding Goals 
	  
The eroding goals archetype is somewhat similar to fixes that fail in that managers 
have a tendency to employ a short-term solution to correct a problem, which results in 
immediate positive outcomes but unintended long-term outcomes. However, in the eroding 
goals archetype, the short-term fix allows a long-term goal to erode. A common phrase 
associated with this archetype might be, “it’s okay if our standards slide a little, just until 
the crisis is over” (Senge, 2006, p. 394). 
Two of the most common themes throughout interviews were declining budgets and 
being stuck in a “crisis-management” mode; many respondents drew a causal relationship 
between the two. Several others brought up the fact that a large proportion of the budget is 
allocated to visitor services, leaving little left over for natural resources and long-term 
monitoring. Managers felt long-term monitoring was important, but often saw the funding 
for it fall through the cracks or go to fixing the crisis of the day. In this case, the goal is 
improving understanding of the system through long-term monitoring, but this goal is 
counterbalanced by crises and day-to-day expenses (e.g. fires, road maintenance). In order 
to improve knowledge of the system, an employee may set aside money for long-term 
monitoring, but over time, that money is siphoned off for other things. Meanwhile, 
managers continue to adjust targets and expectations downwards. 
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Figure	  5:	  Eroding	  Goals	  
The only way to combat goal erosion is for managers to focus on the long-term 
vision. This archetype will continue to be a problem unless the NPS can break its myopic 
culture driven by management and funding cycles, as discussed in previous chapters. 
Managers must readjust their mental models regarding the temporal scope of their goals, 
and make worthwhile long-term efforts a priority.  
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
	  
While many of the respondents in this study have recognized the need for the 
organization to adopt a new ideology better suited to a complex social ecological system, 
the process of transforming this type of agency on an organizational level is difficult. This 
study examined a variety of factors, processes, and feedbacks that emerged from interview 
data in order to assess whether and how the NPS can adopt the new paradigm proposed in 
Revisiting Leopold and become a learning organization.  
While most of those interviewed recognized the need for organizational change, and 
some are already thinking systemically, there remain several institutional barriers that are 
currently preventing the NPS from becoming more adaptable in the face of complexity, 
uncertainty, and volatile change. For example, managers demonstrated the lack of a shared 
vision around what the implementation of Revisiting Leopold will look like. Some 
struggled with fundamental concepts of this new paradigm, such as resiliency and 
managing for coupled human-natural systems. Patterns such as staff turnover and trends 
such as declining budgets force employees to operate on short-term scales. Structural 
components of the NPS, such as decentralized, relatively autonomous parks and rigid silos 
make communication and efficient collaboration difficult, while laws and policies 
surrounding use of funds and partnerships stymie collaboration. Cultural attributes of the 
NPS, such as precautionary preservation and risk-aversion preclude organizational 
learning; deeply ingrained mental models about job roles and the role of science anchor 
employees to the old paradigm.  
7.1 An Opportunity for Transformation 
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 Thomas Kuhn argues that change does not happen gradually but rather, a new 
scientific regime replaces an existing scientific regime when it becomes evident that the 
existing approach is inadequate to address problems or explain anomalies posed by the 
environment (Kuhn, 1998). The publication of the Revisiting Leopold report suggests that 
the NPS’ current paradigm is inadequate to cope with the complexity and change of its 
social and ecological environment, but from the sample of managers interviewed, NPS 
appears to be stuck in the existing regime. According to Kuhn, paradigms change in 
response to some crisis that causes the abandonment of a previous paradigm or institutional 
framework (Kuhn, 1998), and perhaps the NPS has simply not yet confronted that crisis. 
However, in advance of an impending crisis and global environmental change, there is 
often an assumption that people have a limited ability to purposefully effect change 
(O’Brien, 2011).  
 Karen O’Brien questions this assumption. In the face of change, humans often 
consider only three options: mitigation, adaptation, and suffering. Most organizations will 
experience each of these, but sometimes organizations also fail to consider transformation. 
“In one sense, this is not surprising,” O’Brien writes, “as transformation often challenges 
the status quo, threatening those who benefit from current systems and structures (O’Brien, 
2011, p. 668). However, it may be a less painful option than waiting until a crisis forces an 
abrupt paradigm shift. 
 This thesis examines the ability of the NPS to become a more adaptive organization 
in the face of change. Adaptation generally “refers to the act of making something fit for a 
new situation or use” (O’Brien, 2011, p. 669), which in this case refers to making the NPS 
as an organization “fit,” or continue to function and remain relevant, in a new context of 
change, complexity, and uncertainty. However, in order to do that, it has become clear that 
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the NPS also needs to transform, which encompasses “physical and/or qualitative changes 
in form, structure, or meaning making” (O’Brien, 2011, p. 670). This type of deliberate 
transformation often includes a variety of institutional, behavioral, and cultural changes 
that also entails challenging values, assumptions, beliefs, and identities (O’Brien, 2011), 
which aligns with and supports Senge’s process of becoming a learning organization 
(Senge, 2006). While this is not an easy process, the upside is that the NPS has a unique 
opportunity to begin transformation before some form of a crisis abruptly forces the 
organization fully into the new paradigm.  
 The first step to transforming and becoming a learning organization is to learn to 
examine the organization systemically; identify the short-and long-term variables at play, 
the relationships between those variables, and how they operate at different scales. Without 
an understanding of learning disabilities and archetypes that may be preventing the system 
from changing, managers often apply their efforts in the wrong places. Managers may push 
aggressive change efforts, and then are baffled by the resistance to change. By examining 
the patterns and trends, structures, cultures, and mental models at play, managers will better 
be able to identify the processes and feedbacks that are responsible for resisting change 
(Senge, 2006).  
7.2 Leverage Points and Recommendations 
	  
 Once there is a general understanding of the components of a system and how they 
work together, only then is it productive to attempt to change the system. When trying to 
change a system, the most leverage or tractability occurs in trying to change the paradigm 
by being open-minded, challenging existing beliefs and assumptions, and then identifying 
anomalies and failures in the old paradigm. Meadows identifies twelve places in a system, 
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or leverage points, where small changes can result in larger transformation. These points 
increase in effectiveness, or in the amount of leverage they lend, as one moves from 
physical attributes, to feedbacks, to system rules and mental models (Meadows, 1999).  
 The barriers to change identified in this study vary in terms of the degree of effort 
required on the part of the agency to change them. Thus, Meadow’s concept of leverage 
points can help identify those places where some effort will result in much greater changes 
throughout the system. If the NPS is serious about changing its paradigm and implementing 
the ideas in Revisiting Leopold, it may want to consider the following examples of leverage 
points, which increase in order of effectiveness.  
7.2.1 Parameters 
	  
 Parameters, meaning numbers or figures, have the least leverage to change a system 
because they rarely change behavior (Meadows, 1999), but in this case, an example of a 
parameter would be the amount of funding the NPS receives. For instance, the NPS could 
adjust parameters by increasing the amount of funding for ecosystem-scale conservation 
efforts, for social scientists, or for types of science that help managers understand systemic 
processes.  
7.2.2 The Sizes of Buffers and Stabilizing Stocks Relative to Their Flows 
	  
 This leverage point refers to those things that make a system either stable or nimble. 
To increase the stability of the system, one would increase the capacity of the buffer 
(Meadows, 1999). If the NPS decides that it truly values certain natural or cultural 
resources and wants to maintain them in the face of future change, it can do this by creating 
redundancy.  Purposefully adding redundancy in ecological and cultural systems would 
increase resiliency, or the ability of the system to undergo disturbances and maintain those 
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attributes that the NPS deems important (or more accurately robustness, due to the element 
of design and intentionality in this example).  On the other hand, if the NPS wishes to 
become more reactive to changing social attitudes and demographics, for example, it might 
consider increasing the flexibility of its workforce. A large stabilizing stock of “30-plus-
year employees” (R22), for instance, is a buffer that leads to inflexibility.  However, this 
leverage point also ranks low in terms of effectiveness, because buffers and stabilizing 
stocks don’t alter the fundamental nature of the problem (Meadows, 1999).  
7.2.3 The Structure and Nodes of Intersection 
	  
 This leverage point refers to the physical structure and organization of a system, but 
doesn’t often provide leverage because structure and design are difficult to change 
(Meadows, 1999). Similarly, this is not a particularly useful leverage point in the NPS, 
because a merger with other land management agencies or formally breaking down the 
divisions and directorates within the NPS would be a major task. As this study has shown, 
many of the barriers to implementing the ideas in Revisiting Leopold and becoming a 
learning organization are related to the structure of the system, but exercising this leverage 
point would be a heavy lift.  
7.2.4 The Length of Delays Relative to System Changes 
	  
 Delays in feedbacks are common sources of frustration in organizations. “If you’re 
trying to adjust a system state to your goal, but you only receive delayed information about 
what the system state is, you will overshoot and undershoot. Same if your information is 
timely, but your response isn’t,” writes Meadows (1999, p. 8). This leverage point has a 
great amount of power to affect change in a system, but it’s often hard to remove delays, 
especially in a big organization or when change is rapid (Meadows, 1999). Superintendents 
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and other managers make decisions all of the time that affect the natural and social 
environment, but the consequences of those decisions may not appear for a long time. 
Meanwhile, the system has continued to change. For example, NEPA processes can take 
years or even decades, so by the time a decision has gone into effect, the information or on-
the-ground conditions may have changed. Or, the consequences of a superintendent’s 
management decision may not surface until years after the superintendent has retired or 
moved on. Delays are difficult to change, but the NPS can add leverage by increasing 
information feedbacks, such as through the process of long-term monitoring. The NPS 
could also reevaluate the structural and cultural attributes that reward and incentivize short-
term management (e.g. the nature of management cycles, position timelines, and funding 
cycles). In order for the NPS to become a learning organization, it may need to incentivize 
long-term thinking and management that are more in line with ecosystem scale changes 
rather than management scale changes. 
7.2.5 The Strength of Negative Feedback Loops 
	  
 In the archetype examples in the previous chapter, the negative, or balancing 
feedback loops served to unintentionally check or prevent desired change. Negative 
feedback loops can also be beneficial, however, and serve to keep a process on track 
towards meeting its goal. For example, comments and feedback from the public can serve 
as a desirable check on an agency when it begins to take actions with which the public 
disagrees. Similarly, monitoring systems that trigger agency action in the event of resource 
degradation is a beneficial negative feedback loop. As the NPS undergoes change as an 
organization and its social ecological system undergoes rapid change, it will be important 
for the NPS to monitor these changes and foster communication with the public. Further 
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examination of other system archetypes will help identify other beneficial balancing 
feedbacks that provide valuable checks on the system as well as negative feedbacks that 
prevent desirable growth.  
7.2.6 The Gain Around Driving Positive Feedback Loops 
	  
 Meadows presents positive feedback loops, processes of growth, as an undesirable 
condition that will make the system “ultimately destroy itself” (Meadows, 1999). However, 
if an organization is attempting to move into a new paradigm, positive feedback loops may 
be beneficial places to influence the system, precisely because they are self-reinforcing. For 
example, in the archetypes described in chapter 6, relaxing the balancing feedbacks and 
allowing the positive loops to grow would help the NPS implement the ideas in Revisiting 
Leopold and work more systemically. The desire to work across boundaries is growing; 
loosening the balancing forces of contractual constraints, prohibitive overheads, and 
“cultural arrogance” (R16) could help push the system into the new paradigm.  
7.2.7 The Structure of Information Flows 
	  
 Creating new information feedbacks is a powerful leverage point. It’s different than 
those previously mentioned because it’s not a parameter adjustment or reinforcing or 
breaking down an existing loop, but rather a new feedback loop (Meadows, 1999). 
Instituting strong, regular, and open communication feedbacks in which park-level 
managers and policy-makers could communicate freely would help solve many of the 
problems managers reported. For example, the manager who felt that he or she was 
spending all his or her time repeating budget exercises might be able to effect positive 
change if policy-makers were aware of on-the-ground impacts. Respondents expressed 
confusion over the overlap in duties amongst agencies and divisions. If there were greater 
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information flows and feedbacks amongst land management agencies, individual parks, and 
divisions within parks, then this would increase efficiency and learning. One of the learning 
disabilities, “the enemy is out there,” could be partially alleviated by creating new 
information feedbacks that enable employees to see how their actions affect others and the 
organization as a whole.  
7.2.8 The Rules of the System 
	  
 Laws, policies, and incentive systems were not only strong themes that emerged 
from interviews, but they are also strong leverage points (Meadows, 1999). While laws are 
difficult to change, policies are periodically updated, and managers have the ability to 
influence incentive systems. Respondents spoke to many policy and incentive barriers to 
implementing the ideas in Revisiting Leopold, specifically with regard to cyclic and 
inflexible funding allocations; policies, rules and other disincentives to working with 
partners outside of park boundaries; disincentives to taking risks and learning; disincentives 
to working towards long-term goals; and fiscal disincentives for long-term monitoring 
programs, among others. Many of these can be changed through policy or through the way 
that success is evaluated and rewarded by supervisors and more broadly across the NPS. 
For example, in order to incentivize longer-term thinking, performance standards can be 
written in terms of longer-term goals, or greater efforts can be made to create continuity of 
knowledge and long-term goals even as employees change positions or parks.  
7.2.9 The Power to Add, Change, Evolve, or Self-Organize System Structure  
	  
 The ability of a system or an organization to self-organize, or alter its own structure, 
feedback loops, or rules, is an important aspect of resilience (Meadows, 1999). This speaks 
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to O’Brien’s notion that organizations can transform themselves in the face of 
environmental change (O’Brien, 2011).  
Katzenbach, Steffen, and Kronley argue that to make cultural change “stick,” 
organizations should match their strategy to the existing culture, and focus on critical shifts 
that play to the strengths of the agency culture (Katzenbach, Steffen, & Kronley, 2012). 
Interview data reveals an organization of employees who are highly intrinsically motivated; 
thus this is an attribute on which the NPS can capitalize. 
Components of self-organization include raw material and means for 
experimentation (Meadows, 1999). In the case of the NPS and its unique situation on the 
verge of a paradigm shift, the raw material is a group of motivated early adopters and 
information about the system, its relationships, and feedbacks. The benefit of the 
decentralized organizational structure that respondents described is that it provides a 
convenient means for experimentation. Twenty-three early adopters were interviewed in 
this study, some of whom are in a unique position to test aspects of agency transformation 
within their park or region. Innovations in a decentralized system will align more closely 
with park-level needs and on the ground problems, and are more likely to be adopted at the 
local level (Rogers, 2003). Additionally, respondents report high levels of creativity at the 
park level. To the extent that the organization is also hierarchical and centralized at some 
scales, this can aid direct communication between change agents, opinion leaders, and 
adopters (Rogers, 2003).  
In order to exercise this leverage point and self-evolve, however, some managers 
must be given the power to change and evolve. To become a learning organization and use 
these lessons in a truly adaptive sense to improve self-organization and transformation, 
managers must be able to take risks, fail, and learn constructively from failure.  
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7.2.10 The Goals of the System 
	  
The goal of a system is one of the strongest leverage points, because it is the goal 
that determines structures, flows, and feedbacks. This type of goal is broader than goals 
that people often think of as the goals of their job (e.g. to educate visitors, to study 
resources, or to provide for visitor safety). Examples of broader, systemic goals include 
resilience, survival, or preservation.  The NPS as a system was originally set up to preserve 
resources in a static condition, as a snapshot in time.  
Now, in an environment of complexity, uncertainty, and rapid, volatile change, the 
goals of the system are changing. Revisiting Leopold describes goals appropriate to this 
new paradigm, but managers are still struggling to discern what this means for on-the-
ground management. Respondents widely admitted confusion about resilience, and what 
the purpose of the organization is now that the lines between what is natural and what is 
anthropogenic have been blurred. If the NPS can invest in creating a shared vision within 
the NPS for what this new management paradigm will look like, then this will perhaps be 
one of the most powerful leverage points.   
7.2.11 The Mental Models Out of Which a Paradigm Arises 
	  
As in Senge’s iceberg model, all goals, processes, feedbacks, cultures, structures, and 
events flow from the mental models that form the basis for the paradigm (Senge et al., 
2008). These unstated assumptions and beliefs are where some of the greatest leverage lies. 
Paradigms are difficult to change at the society or organizational scale, but Meadows draws 
upon Kuhn to explain how paradigms change:  
“You keep pointing at the anomalies and failures in the old paradigm, you keep 
speaking louder and with assurance from the new one, you insert people with 
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the new paradigm in places of public visibility and power. You don’t waste time 
with reactionaries; rather you work with active change agents and with the vast 
middle ground of people who are open minded.” (Meadows, 1999, p. 18) 
Interview data showed that mental models surrounding impairment and the NPS 
mission appear to be changing, because the majority of respondents felt that the 
mission could be viewed with a wider lens to encompass the concept of change. Very 
few respondents reported feeling uncomfortable or noticing a conflict with the NPS 
mission and embracing volatile change and uncertainty. This study purposefully 
targeted early adopters, however, and not all employees have embraced the idea of 
managing for change. As several respondents described, the preservationist model of 
the old paradigm still very much pervades the organization. Other mental models 
about job roles (“I am my position”) and the role of science as providing an answer or 
a short term fix also need to be addressed if the NPS wishes to move into a more 
systemic, postnormal paradigm.  
7.2.12 Transcending Paradigms 
	  
The final leverage point is beyond the scope of the paradigm; it is the ability to take 
a step back, detach oneself, and to recognize that paradigms are constantly changing; thus 
one “true” paradigm does not exist. Everyone is shaped by their own assumptions and 
beliefs, so the ability to remove oneself from one’s own mental model and remain flexible 
is the most effective tool of all (Meadows, 1999). The National Park Service has undergone 
several paradigm changes in its history (Sellars, 1997), and will continue to do so in the 
future. 
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With this in mind, the NPS is in a position to evaluate whether it wishes to 
transform itself to embrace the type of paradigm the Revisiting Leopold describes. As the 
implementation team begins to think through how it might prioritize and implement some 
of the ideas in Revisiting Leopold, it would benefit from considering some of the mental 
models, structural and cultural characteristics, archetypes, learning disabilities, and 
leverage points identified from the data in this study.     
7.3 Recommendations for Experimental Sites 
	  
Revisiting Leopold represents an attempt to address one of Meadow’s leverage 
points, changing the goals of the system (Meadows, 1999), but it’s clear that the NPS 
hasn’t yet succeeded in changing the mental models out of which the “old” paradigm arose. 
However, one of the most powerful leverage points is the power to add, change, evolve, or 
self-organize system structure (Meadows, 1999). In the interest of becoming a learning 
organization, I propose testing some of the recommendations in this report and 
experimenting with leverage points in some selected units managed by early adopters. If 
select units are able to test these ideas and observe how they affect the system, then this 
will help the NPS better understand itself as a system as well as the most effective places to 
enact change. The following section draws upon the literature and the results of this study 
to develop specific suggestions as to what an experimental site might look like and who 
within the organization should lead this type of experiment. 
 In accordance with the idea of emergent complexity, actions taken in one location at 
one point in time will likely result in different consequences than those of the same action 
taken at a different place and/or time. Therefore, I recommend selecting multiple park units 
in multiple regions, and comparing the processes and outcomes of suggested experimental 
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actions. Similarly, in accordance with concept of nested hierarchies, I recommend 
experimenting with one or two offices at the regional scale and one or two divisions or 
work units at the national scale.  
 To capitalize on the strengths of the current decentralized structure of which 
respondents spoke, it may be most beneficial to select park units, offices, or divisions that 
are relatively autonomous from one another. Based on Rogers’ work, a decentralized 
system has several advantages from a diffusion perspective. For example, members of a 
decentralized unit will have more buy-in with regard the innovation, as the implementation 
of new ideas often involves spontaneity and local creativity. In addition, solutions are more 
likely to address the needs of the employees, and therefore are likely to instigate higher 
levels of adoption (Rogers, 2003).  
 I also suggest capitalizing on the early adopters within the organization to act as 
change agents. Early adopters are well respected by their peers, occupy a position with 
enough power and leverage to enact change, likely understand the concepts in Revisiting 
Leopold, and may already thinking systemically (Rogers, 2003). These are superintendents 
and the types of employees at the regional and national level that fall within my sampling 
frame.  
 A change agent is most successful when they are in touch with those hoping to 
enact change, but are more socially integrated with the “clients,” or the employees in which 
they hope to inspire change. Those early adopters or change agents who are socially 
integrated with the unit in which they want to enact change are better positioned to receive 
feedback, possess credibility and rapport, and are better able to tailor these experimental 
actions to their employees’ needs (Rogers, 2003). This provides further support for the use 
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of superintendents and early adopters at the regional and national level as change agents in 
these experimental sites.  
7.3.1 What type of actions would an experimental unit employ? 
	  
 As Senge conveys through his iceberg model, it is more effective to enact change at 
the bottom levels of the iceberg than it is to work at the event level (Senge et al., 2008).  
Therefore, the change agents at each unit should address the culture and mental models of 
the experimental units, as well as the learning disabilities and archetypes identified in this 
study. In doing so, they will also be testing several of Meadows’ most effective leverage 
points. Table 2 summarizes suggested experimentation actions, which are discussed in 
more specific detail below.  
Finally, the suggestions described below are designed to be specific enough to 
provide clear, useful suggestions for change agents, yet broad enough to leave room for 
local creativity and for change agents to feel empowered to test these recommendations in a 
way that meets local needs and circumstances. In this way, successful experimental actions 
and innovations will carry higher rates of adoption (Rogers, 2003).  
 
 
Table	  2:	  Recommendations	  for	  an	  Experimental	  Site	  
Systemic Properties Recommendations for An Experimental Unit 
Culture of Learning • Discuss and develop a shared vision for this change effort 
and for the organization under the new paradigm 
• Create and incentivize a culture of risk tolerance and 
learning 
• Reward and incentivize transboundary management, 
long-term goals, and interdisciplinary work 
Mental Models • Break divisional “lenses” through interdisciplinary 
education, collaboration, and communication 
• Explore alternate forms of knowledge and decision-
making, such as more interdisciplinary, systemic, and 
postnormal science 
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• Discuss what it means to manage for change and address 
fear around the topic 
• Create flexibility in the budget to allow managers to 
focus on long-term goals and balanced priorities 
 
Learning Disabilities • Write longer term goals and breadth into position 
descriptions and performance evaluations 
• Create information feedbacks across divisions and over 
time 
• Conduct open dialogues to discuss park-level and agency-
level goals and issues, and explore how everyone’s 
actions contribute 
• Be introspective and consider systemic relationships 
before taking actions 
Archetypes • Allow desired positive feedback loops to build, and 
loosen undesired negative feedback loops 
• Evaluate whether short-term fixes that have worked in the 
past are truly addressing the root of the problem 
• Identify important long-term goals and ensure funding 
and continuity of support for those goals  
Learning Feedbacks • Document, discuss, and share progress on and issues with 
the experiment 
 
7.3.2 Fostering a Culture of Learning 
	  
 Critical to any change effort and learning organization is a shared vision of the 
agency’s goals and how to achieve them. Change agents should initiate an open discussion 
of the concepts fundamental to the new paradigm such as resilience, coupled human-natural 
systems, scale, and the role of science, and what they mean for the organization.  
As the data from this study show, some employees identified a culture of risk-
aversion, as well as disincentives to risk-taking and learning. Change agents should foster a 
culture of informed risk-taking, such that employees feel empowered to exercise creativity, 
take risks within reason, and employ true adaptive management. To do this, managers 
should reward creativity and innovation, even when the effort has unexpected outcomes.  
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Additionally, while collaborative efforts appear to be growing in popularity, some 
respondents felt that some managers and supervisors still discourage working at broader 
scales. In an experimental site, a change agent should encourage and reward partnerships 
and collaboration with entities outside of park boundaries, perhaps by rewarding and 
recognizing employees’ efforts.  
7.3.3 Addressing Mental Models 
	  
 In order to address the mental models that perpetuate the old paradigm, people must 
first become aware of them. I recommend that change agents encourage introspection in 
themselves and employees, and discuss mental models openly. For example, one way that 
change agents can help break divisional lenses is to discuss how employees’ mental models 
differ across divisions, and then actively promote and provide opportunities for 
interdisciplinary education, collaboration, and communication. In addition to the mental 
models discussed in this thesis, employees will likely identify other mental models that 
exist within the organization.  
 Another important issue mangers of experimental units should discuss with 
employees concerns what it means to manage for change. Managing for change will be 
different depending on the NPS unit or office and the values that the public and agency 
place on certain resources. This will likely involve a series of difficult discussions, and 
change agents should specifically address the fear and discomfort that employees and the 
public will likely possess about the topic.   
In addition to these discussions, I recommend that change agents and managers in 
these experimental units consider the role of science in decision-making, specifically by 
considering what types of science are appropriate in various decision-making contexts. In 
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the interest of better understanding the system in which the unit operates, change agents 
may want to consider studies that explore relationships between variables in the system and 
incorporate more social science.  
This study also revealed mental models around a perceived need to cater to visitors 
and public opinion. Several managers felt that this perceived need sometimes interfered 
with the ability to protect resources; this mental model is institutionalized in the form of 
rigid budget allocations that heavily favor spending on visitor services. In order to break 
away from the tendency to spend money on short-term projects and visitor services at the 
expense of long-term monitoring or non-charismatic but necessary projects, change agents 
in experimental units must have greater budget flexibility.  Creating flexibility in the 
budget may allow managers to maintain focus on long-term goals and will allow mangers 
to allocate funds in accordance with their priorities. Importantly, more budget flexibility 
will also allow units to test whether mental models have indeed shifted, based on the way 
that managers choose to spend money.  
7.3.4 Addressing Learning Disabilities 
	  
 Senge identifies seven organizational learning disabilities (Senge, 2006), and four 
are discussed in this thesis. As with mental models, change agents may wish to discuss 
organizational learning disabilities with employees and attempt to identify others that may 
exist within that unit. According to the results of this study, I recommend that change 
agents address the “I am my position” learning disability by incorporating more breadth 
into position descriptions and performance evaluations. For example, rather than simply 
detailing the narrow duties of a specific position, change agents should promote position 
descriptions and performance evaluations that include working with others towards broader 
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park and agency goals. Similarly, they should also include longer-term goals at greater 
temporal scales. Change agents should encourage continuity of worthwhile projects over 
time, even as employees turn over.  
 Further, to prevent “the enemy is out there” mentality, I recommend that change 
agents create and strengthen information feedbacks across divisions and over time. This 
could include regular interdisciplinary meetings to discuss park or unit level issues with a 
broader range of employees at multiple GS levels rather than just amongst the management 
team or a select interdisciplinary team. Employees should feel free to discuss issues openly, 
and these open dialogues should explore the ways in which all employees’ actions 
contribute to successes or problems at the unit and agency levels. Finally, change agents 
themselves should be introspective and consider systemic relationships before taking 
actions, and avoid the tendency to be proactive without attempting to understand the root of 
the problem.  
7.3.5 Using Archetypes 
	  
 This study examined three archetypes: limits to growth, fixes that fail, and eroding 
goals (Senge, 2006). While other feedbacks and processes operate within the organization, 
I recommend that change agents within experimental units test the leverage points that 
these archetypes bring to light.  
 For example, in the limits to growth archetype discussed in the previous chapter, the 
growing understanding of the need for partnerships and transboundary management 
emerged as a desirable positive feedback loop. However, it is being checked by legal, 
fiscal, contractual, and practical barriers to working at broader scales. Therefore, I 
recommend that change agents in these experimental units attempt to loosen theses 
Organizational Adaptation in an Era of Complexity, Uncertainty, and Change 
	  
	   128	  
constraints to the extent that they are able, and observe whether dismantling the balancing 
feedback loop results in more partnerships and transboundary management.   
 The second archetype that emerged from this data is fixes that fail. Data collected 
from respondents revealed a tendency to rely upon more science and research to cope with 
complexity and uncertainty, which often in turn, reveals more complexity and uncertainty. 
In this example, change agents should promote a greater acceptance of complexity and 
uncertainty, which will likely involve addressing employees’ mental models and better 
communication about these issues with the public.  
 The third archetype, eroding goals, is one that requires change agents and managers 
to hold themselves accountable. Despite day-to-day pressures that distract managers from 
long-term goals, change agents and managers must find a way to maintain focus on long-
term efforts to attain their goals. Whether this involves setting aside consistent and reliable 
funding for long-term monitoring or important projects, it is important that decision-makers 
recognize that some enduring efforts are necessary or worthwhile, even though results 
don’t often manifest until years later.  
7.3.6 Creating Feedbacks to Learn from Experimental Sites 
	  
 Whether these recommendations result in the intended consequences or not, an 
equally valuable outcome of this proposed experiment is a greater understanding of the 
system in which the NPS operates and its complexities. To learn from these actions, change 
agents at experimental sites should document progress on and issues with implementing the 
above recommendations. Furthermore, it will be useful to discuss progress and issues with 
employees of the experimental unit, other experimental sites, and the broader organization.  
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Based on the results of this thesis, my primary recommendation for the NPS is to 
examine and reflect upon the relationships, processes and feedbacks at play within and 
outside of the organization. By understanding the systems at play within the organization as 
well as the broader system in which it operates, the NPS will be better prepared to adapt to 
its rapidly changing, complex, and uncertain environment. 
7.4 Conceptual Model, Limitations, and Further Research 
	  
	   After considering the process and outcomes of this study, the following section 
evaluates the utility and appropriateness of systems thinking as a primary conceptual 
framework, discusses the limitations of this study, and raises opportunities for future 
research.  
7.4.1 Systems Thinking as a Framework for This Study 
	  
 This thesis primarily employs systems thinking as a conceptual framework, and 
relies most heavily on Peter Senge’s model. In retrospect, this model was in fact a highly 
useful and applicable framework to apply to this research topic. The context for this study 
is increasing complexity and change in social ecological systems, making systems thinking 
particularly applicable because of its ability to identify recurring patterns, processes, and 
relationships in the midst of dynamic complexity. The ideas presented in the Revisiting 
Leopold report, such as managing for change, embracing uncertainty, working across 
boundaries at landscape and seascape scales, and managing for resiliency, among others, 
align neatly with the components of systems thinking. 
 A number of academic fields were relevant to and contributed the research 
questions in this study. Systems thinking was therefore an appropriate model because 
components of the concept emerge in literature across disciplines. The fundamental 
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concepts of Senge’s framework also resonate through Ackoff’s work in the field of 
operational research (Ackoff, 1962), Schein’s work on organizational culture (Schein, 
1995), Meadow’s work in the field of sustainability (Meadows, 1999), Fernandez and 
Rainey’s research in public administration (Fernandez & Rainey, 2006), Kotter’s research 
on leadership and change (Kotter, 2007), O’Brien’s work in sociology and human 
geography (O’Brien, 2011), and to an extent, Rogers’ diffusion of innovation theory 
(Rogers, 2003), among others. Thus, systems thinking served as a useful unifying thread.  
 This research not only produced many hours of data, which in itself became quite 
complex, but I have also been personally involved in the organization for the past four 
years. Senge’s concept of systems thinking was critical to helping me detach myself from 
my own mental models about the organization, to the extent possible, in order to examine 
the larger systemic processes and feedbacks occurring within it.  
7.4.2 Limitations of This Study 
 
This same reason, however, also highlights a limitation of this study. The author’s 
experience working for the NPS inevitably introduces some level of bias. For example, the 
author knows a number of the respondents personally, which could alter the responses 
given or the nature of the conversation. Further, the motivation to conduct the research 
arose partly from personal experience, which may have influenced the development of 
research questions and other components of the study.  
 While all qualitative data is interpreted through the researcher, and “all human 
activity, including research, is accomplished from a specific standpoint” (Warren & 
Karner, 2010, p. 9), efforts were made to reduce bias and increase validity. All results 
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reported and conclusions drawn can be traced directly back to interview data, and the 
author’s primary advisor checked portions of the author’s interpretations of raw data.  
A second limitation of this study relates to the sampling method. Snowball 
sampling was employed with the intent of finding respondents that would provide the 
richest data on the topic. However, it is limited by the fact that respondents refer others that 
they know personally. In an effort to prevent selecting a sample of employees with similar 
viewpoints, respondents were asked to refer another employee who might be taking steps to 
implement the report, as well as to refer an employee who might disagree with the 
respondent or the ideas in the report.  Regardless, it is possible that respondents have 
stronger networks with those who hold similar viewpoints.  
All respondents but one had read the report prior to being contacted for the 
interview, but many people had re-read or reviewed the report before the interview. In one 
sense, this was helpful because respondents were more likely to understand the question 
and provide rich, thoughtful answers. However, it is possible that the ideas in the report 
influenced respondents’ personal viewpoints. Although interviewees were assured of 
confidentiality, some may have consciously or unconsciously felt the need to agree with the 
ideas in the report, even if the report conflicted with their personal mental models about the 
organization.  
Third, a major limitation of this study was that respondents were asked to make 
generalities about the NPS as an organization. While this is necessary for an 
organizational-level study, and many respondents substantiated their views with specific 
examples and stories, no organization is homogenous. As one interviewee pointed out, 
“Everything you can say about the Park Service is false. Everything you can say about the 
Park Service is true” (R3). There is a lot of variation within an organization, and although 
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every effort was made to ensure a diverse and representative sample, many nuances may 
not have emerged. In the same way that the researcher’s interpretation of data is subjective 
and affected by other influences, interviewees also give subjective responses.  It is possible 
that interviewees’ responses are influenced by social norms and perceptions about how the 
NPS operates.  
Finally, it is important to note that the results of this study, like most qualitative 
research, are not generalizable. Results are limited by the individuals interviewed, the point 
in time of the interview, other circumstances of data collection.  
7.4.3 Further Research Questions 
 
The findings of this study imply further research implications and opportunities. A 
limited number of mental models, learning disabilities, and archetypes were analyzed for 
this study, but these are by no means exhaustive. Additional consideration of other 
processes and feedbacks are critical to becoming a learning organization. A need exists to 
experiment with some of these leverage points if the NPS truly wants to transform the 
agency. As mentioned above, parks managed by early adopters provide a convenient unit in 
which to test some of the recommendations and considerations of this study.  
Also, the NPS operates within a system of nested hierarchies, and as a result, it 
would be both beneficial and interesting to apply these research questions at different 
scales. Other land management agencies are grappling with similar issues, and may provide 
valuable insight on the nature of organizational change and transformation. Similarly, 
individual parks are likely addressing the changing paradigm in different ways, which may 
or may not depend on characteristics of that park. 
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Additionally, interviewees’ responses may have been influenced by the ideas in the 
Revisiting Leopold report, or by a conscious or subconscious desire to support the ideas 
within it. Further research could explore the extent to which an organization is moving into 
a new paradigm in the absence of a report that promotes its central ideas.  
An interesting outcome of this study was the ease with which respondents were able 
to reconcile the NPS mission with managing for change that is not fully understood. At the 
same time, respondents also demonstrated discomfort with regard to the purpose of the 
NPS under the new paradigm. This raises questions about the process of altering deeply 
ingrained mental models, and how employees cope with competing goals.  
This study intentionally targeted early adopters, identified as those at the division 
chief level and above. However, in order to understand the extent to which the new 
paradigm is permeating through the whole organization, future studies may benefit from a 
wider sampling frame.     
Finally, this thesis largely focused on natural resource parks and natural resource 
issues. Social and cultural components were included to the extent that social and 
ecological systems are interrelated, but further research into both social and cultural aspects 
of the system are warranted.  
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Appendix A: Interview Guide 
	  
Background 
1. Can you briefly describe your current job and list any other parks or NPS offices 
that you’ve worked at?  
 
Social Ecological Systems and Resilience 
 
2. If you’ve had a chance to review it, what was your understanding of Revisiting 
Leopold, and what did you think of it? 
 
Some Level of Understanding/ Neutral or 
Positive Reception 
Does Not Understand/ Negative Perception 
of Implementation 
a. How do you see this being 
implemented, both in your park and 
across the NPS? 
i. The Leopold Report largely 
redefines the scope of our 
environment and the problems we 
face as much more complex and 
rapidly changing than in the past. 
How do see the agency dealing with 
this type of complexity and change? 
ii. This report redefines what the NPS 
previously considered natural and 
calls for coupled human-natural 
systems, so how do we deal with 
what is natural and what is 
anthropogenic? 
iii. The report talks about managing for 
resilience, such that a system can 
undergo disturbances but still retain 
the ability to function in a similar 
way. What would a resilient 
National Park System look like? 
 
a. What was confusing or problematic 
in the report? 
b. What would you have liked to see 
in the document to make the report 
more useful? 
i. The problems the NPS faces are 
more complex and our 
environment is changing much 
more rapidly than in the past. 
How do see the agency dealing 
with this type of complexity and 
change? 
ii. This report redefines what the 
NPS previously considered 
natural and calls for coupled 
human-natural systems, so how 
do we deal with what is natural 
and what is anthropogenic? 
iii. The report talks about managing 
for resilience, such that a system 
can undergo disturbances but still 
retain the ability to function in a 
similar way. What would a 
resilient National Park System 
look like? 
 
c. Do you see this as a change, or a shift in NPS ideology that needs to or 
should happen in the NPS?  
 
i. If so, what do you think would be 
the impetus for change, and where 
would or should it come from? 
 
ii. If not, why not? If the NPS is 
already doing this, how? Can 
you give an example? 
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The Learning Organization: Organizational Structure & Culture 
 
3. What would be the challenges to implementing this? 
a. Do you think a mission-driven organization can do this? Does the NPS 
mission facilitate this kind of change?  
b. Do you think the NPS is structured in a way to allow it to do this? 
What are the incentives to collaborating at broader scales?  
c. What are the incentives for working towards longer-term goals rather than 
attaining short-term achievements? 
 
 
4. What are the qualities of a good and effective manager (superintendent or resource 
manager)?  
a. How is success evaluated and rewarded in the NPS? 
b. How does the NPS deal with risk and uncertainty in social and ecological 
systems?  
iii. What happens when NPS fails, or makes a mistake?  
d. How would you describe your own inclination towards risk-taking? 
 
 
Postnormal Science 
 
5. What roles do science, politics, and values play in decision-making? What type of 
information is most helpful when making difficult, high profile, or value-laden 
decisions? 
a. How important and useful is stakeholder input? 
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Appendix B: Interview Guide for Contributors to Revisiting Leopold 
 
1.Can you briefly describe your current job and your involvement in the Revisiting 
Leopold Report? 
 
Social Ecological Systems and Resilience 
 
2. Why was this report created?  
a. What do you want this report to do? 
b. Who was the audience? Who was this meant to speak to? 
c. Were you hoping for impacts similar to the impacts of the first report? 
 
 
3. Process 
a. How were the contributors/ members of the Advisory Board Science 
Committee chosen? 
b. How did you decide what was most important to address in the Revisiting 
Leopold report? 
 
4. Change 
a. Is there some new insight on change that this committee felt like even the 
scientific  community needs to think about in a different way? (perhaps the 
pace of change, where in the system change is occurring, or social change?) 
What was this “new” insight on change? 
 
b. How did the team envision – balance between continual change and 
preservation & ecological restoration?  
§ I know that the report specifically says that the committee is not 
suggesting a revision of the NPS mission, but can you manage for 
continual change in the NPS without revisiting the mission? Is there 
a philosophic disconnect here? 
 
5. Tell me about this idea of transformative experiences – where do you see that 
going? Why that word? Why that type of experience and who is transforming? 
Does it imply that the NPS has to transform to make this happen?   
 
Scientific Paradigm/Ideology Shifts 
 
6. Do you see this an ideological shift or a substantial evolution within the NPS?  
 
7. Some people (do) see this as a major ideological shift for the agency. How do you 
think change occurs within a large organization like the NPS?  
a. Do you think it’s in response to some crisis or apparent need, or do 
think ideological change happens gradually? 
 
Systems Thinking and Organizational Change 
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8. Have you received any feedback or reactions from NPS employees? If so, what 
was the general response? 
a. Generally, without giving away their identities, what was their position in 
the NPS, and why do you think they felt this way? 
 
9. How do you see this being rolled out, or implemented?  
 
10.  What do you think the challenges are to implementing this within the NPS? 
a. What do you see as the structural barriers to implementation, if any? 
b. What do you see as the cultural barriers to implementation, if any? 
 
11. What kinds of science programs do you see emerging in the NPS to deal with these 
human-natural systems?  
• So if we consider the NPS as a social-ecological system, with its own set of pre-
existing values that guide/determine how it operates, how do you envision building 
in a feedback to these socio-ecological systems that will inform these underlying 
values that guide the processes within the agency?  
• How do we use the science the report is calling for to inform the underlying values 
that drive the system, or drive the way the NPS operates? 
 
 
12. Do you know of anybody who is taking steps to implement this? 
 
13. Do you know of anyone who might disagree with you or the ideas in this report? 
 
	  
